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REGULATION OF IMPORTS AND FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
ON NATIONAL SECURITY GROUNDS
David Scott Nance & Jessica Wasserman*
The second half of the twentieth century has seen what may prove
to be a fundamental shift in the focus of economic activity from the
national to the global scale. Goods, services, and capital now cross
international boundaries with unprecedented speed and ease.' More-
over, the trend continues to be in the direction of increasing freedom
of trade and investment. Counterpoised against this increasing free-
dom, however, is perhaps the most fundamental concern of the nation-
state: national security. 2
Traditionally, concerns over the effects of trade and investment on
national security have centered upon the transfer of products and
technologies with potential military uses.3 However, national security
* The authors, graduates of the University of Michigan Law School in 1982 and 1984 re-
spectively, practice international trade law with the firm of Stewart and Stewart in Washington,
DC. They wish to thank Eugene L. Stewart and Terence P. Stewart for their encouragement and
assistance in preparing this article, and Patrick McDonough, Kelly Roberson and Rosemary
Winston for their invaluable aid in obtaining the necessary materials.
1. For general discussions of the changes in the international economy, see, e.g., PANEL ON
THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROL ON INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANS-
FER, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC POLICY, BALANCING THE NA-
TIONAL INTEREST 54-59 (1987) [hereinafter BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST].
2. See M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 250
(1961), quoted in WHITEMAN, 12 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 42-43 (1971). McDougal
and Feliciano refer to self-defense as the "first and most basic policy of any legal system," and
describe it as the prevention of "unilateral change by destructive coercion." Id. Thus, in tradi-
tional international law, national defense and the preservation of national security have been
viewed in terms of defense against forceful actions by other states as well. The transformation, or
rather extension, of the concept of "national security" to include economic strength as well is a
theme that will be developed further in this article.
3. For a comprehensive overview of this issue, see BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST,
supra note 1, at 1-27. This volume was the product of an exhaustive review of the national
security dimensions of the export control regime of the United States by a panel operating under
the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences. Although the issue of export controls falls
outside the scope of this article, the results of the review may bear some relevance to an analysis
of the import and foreign investment control laws of the United States, at least insofar as those
laws reflect national security considerations.
The panel confirmed that superiority in technology was a matter of strategic importance to
the United States and its allies. Id. at 151-52. However, the panel found that the export control
regime of the United States was too broad (i.e., covering too many products and technologies) to
be perceived as credible. See id. at 152-53. The panel also concluded that over-strict export
controls unnecessarily cost United States companies export sales. Id. at 153. The direct, short-
run economic costs of the U.S. control mechanism were estimated at $9.3 billion for 1985, while
the indirect costs for the same year were $17.1 billion, with an estimated loss of 188,000 jobs. Id.
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concerns also arise with respect to the economic and military impact
of imports and of foreign acquisition of domestic assets. The United
States has a longstanding statute, section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, 4 that allows the President to restrict imports of goods on
national security grounds. More recently, another statute, popularly
referred to as the Exon-Florio Act,5 provides the President with au-
thority to bar the acquisition of United States companies or businesses
by foreign persons on national security grounds. Thus, United States
law provides for the regulation of inward flows of both goods and capi-
tal for reasons of national security. This article will examine the sub-
stance, interpretation, and application of these laws, and comment
upon possible future developments in light of evolving trends in the
global economy.
In particular, the article will focus upon the concept of "national
security" in this context, a concept that is central to both statutes, yet
is not defined or described in either. As will be shown below, 6 the
focus of both statutes has been on the military implications of imports
and foreign investment. Such an approach is consistent with the tradi-
tional interpretation of "national security" under international law. 7
This article will, among other things, explore whether such a defini-
tion accurately reflects current international conditions. If, as is ar-
gued, such a definition is not sufficiently broad, the central question
becomes whether these statutes are flexible enough to take a revised,
broader definition of national security into account.
I. SECTION 232
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is entitled "Safe-
guarding national security." The overall purpose of the section is to
permit the restriction of imports of particular products if such imports
might constitute a threat to the national security of the United States.
8
at 264. The panel's ultimate conclusion was that U.S. export controls were tighter than neces-
sary for national military security, and that these excessive controls had weakened the economic
vitality of the country, thus impairing the equally important economic component of national
security. See id. at 177. Of course, recent events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have
caused many to question the current strictness of export controls. See, e.g., Kenworthy, U.S.
High-Tech Exports to East Bloc Urged, Washington Post, Dec. 18, 1989, at A 1, col. 1. Nonethe-
less, the extent to which controls will actually be relaxed remains to be seen. But see Auerbach,
US. Drafting Plan to Relax Technology Export Curbs, Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1989, at Fl,
col. 2.
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988).
5. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (West Supp. 1989).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 75 and 178.
7. See supra note 2.
8. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 135-36 (1987) [hereinafter S. REP. No.
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The section consists of three general parts, providing respectively for
the application of national security considerations to trade negotia-
tions, presidential authority to limit imports on national security
grounds, and the procedural framework for the application of the sec-
tion. The most important feature of the section is its provision for
investigations of the national security effect of imports upon the peti-
tion of private parties.
A. Limitations on Duty Reductions under Trade Agreements
The first subsection of section 232 prohibits the President from de-
creasing import duties or removing other import restrictions under his
authority to conclude trade agreements, where such action would
threaten to impair the national security. 9 This section entered the law
as part of the Trade Expansion Act of 1954, which authorized the
President to negotiate tariff reductions within the context of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.' 0 The purpose of the provision
was to prevent the President from using this authority to lower tariffs
on articles or to take other action, where such action could harm the
national security. Congress was concerned in particular that indus-
One obvious question arising from a consideration of the section and its purpose is the extent
to which it is consistent with the obligations of the United States under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, art XXI, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. In fact, national laws such as
section 232 are specifically provided for under article XXI of the General Agreements on Tariffs
and Trade, which provides for "Security Exceptions." Id., art. XXI. Among other provisions,
this article provides that nothing in the GATT shall be construed as preventing a member state
from taking "any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests" "relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic
in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying
the military establishment." The notes to the GATT do not otherwise discuss this exception.
Commentators have noted that this article provides a very broad exception to the operation
of the GATT. On the infrequent occasions when the section has been discussed, the result has
generally been an affirmation of the absolute right of states to disregard GATT rules on grounds
of national security. The most recent, and most significant, invocation of the article was by the
United States to justify a total ban on trade with Nicaragua, a member of GATT. The United
States explicitly based its action on article XXI. Nicaragua in turn argued that it could not
realistically be considered a threat to the national security of the United States. A GATT panel
was appointed to consider the matter; as yet, no decision has been reached. See J. JACKSON & W.
DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 915-16 (1986).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (1988). The text of the subsection reads:
No action shall be taken pursuant to section 1821(a) of this title [basic authority of the
President to negotiate trade agreements] or pursuant to section 1351 of this title [promulga-
tion of foreign trade agreements] to decrease or eliminate the duty or other import restric-
tion on any article if the President determines that such reduction or elimination would
threaten to impair the national security.
Of course, the Constitution allocates to Congress the power to fix import duty levels. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3. The authority of Congress to delegate such power to the President is well-
established. Section 232 represents only one of many circumstances under which Congress has
delegated the power to regulate foreign commerce to the President.
10. See Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1954, ch. 445, § 2, 68 Stat. 360 (1954).
Spring 1990] Regulation of Imports and Foreign Investment 929
tries in the United States producing goods viewed as vital to national
security could be harmed by exposure to the increased competition
from imports that tariff reductions could bring. 1
Three features of this amendment merit comment. Although the
subsection is in the form of a prohibition, it is a prohibition without
essential substance. The subsection prohibits action to decrease duties
or otherwise to eliminate trade barriers pursuant to trade agreements
if the President determines that to do so would threaten to impair the
national security. Yet it is the President who determines in the first
place whether such reductions or eliminations will occur.1 2 Accord-
ingly, the actual effect of the subsection is to direct the President to
take national security considerations into account in negotiating trade
agreements, something he presumably would do in any case. The sec-
ond significant feature of the subsection is that there is no provision
for involvement by any party other than the President in this determi-
nation. A private party, therefore, would not be able to challenge such
actions as duty reductions on national security grounds. Finally, there
is no record that this subsection has ever been explicitly invoked, a
result that is unsurprising in light of the subsection's practical
insubstantiality.
B. Restriction of Imports on National Security Grounds
Of more interest, and more relevance, are the remaining provisions
of section 232. Under section 232(b),13 upon the request of the head of
any department or agency or upon application by an interested party,
the Secretary of Commerce must initiate and conduct an investigation
of the effects of imports of a specific article on the national security of
the United States. The Secretary may also initiate such investigations
on his own. Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the Secretary
files a report with the President stating whether he has determined
that imports have been imported in such quantities or under such cir-
cumstances as to "threaten to impair the national security [of the
11. See H.R. REP. No. 1761, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-15 (1958) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
1761].
12. See 19 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1988) (authority for President to enter into trade agreements
when he determines that existing duties or other import restrictions of the United States or other
countries unduly burden the foreign trade of the United States); 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a) (1988) (au-
thority of President to enter into foreign trade agreements and to proclaim reductions in United
States customs duties and other import restrictions).
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A) (1988). The text of this subsection reads:
Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an interested
party, or upon his own motion, the Secretary of Commerce [hereafter in this section referred
to as the "Secretary"] shall immediately initiate an appropriate investigation to determine
the effects on national security of imports of the article which is the subject of such request,
application, or motion.
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United States]."' 14 The President must then determine whether he
agrees with the Secretary's findings, and if so, determine what action,
if any, is to be taken to "adjust" imports of such articles so that the
imports will not pose a threat to national security.15
On its face, section 232 gives the President broad powers to restrict
or even bar imports of products if he determines that such imports
"threaten to impair" national security. Significantly, the section also
provides a means for private parties to seek action under this provi-
sion. As will be shown below, however, in practice section 232 has
been applied relatively seldom, and only under very limited circum-
stances. The remainder of section I of this article will examine the
terms of section 232, the standards that are applied to its invocation,
and the conditions under which action has actually been taken under
this provision.
Section 232 first entered the law as section 2 of the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1954, which provided that no reduction in duty rates could
be made pursuant to a trade agreement if such reduction would
threaten domestic production needed for projected national defense re-
quirements. 16 In 1955, the section was amended to provide further
that the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization could conduct
an investigation into whether an article was being imported in such
quantities as to threaten to impair national security, and that, if the
President agreed with an affirmative determination, he could take such
action "as he deem[ed] necessary" to adjust imports to a level that
would not threaten to impair the national security. 17 Although there
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A) (1988). The text of this subsection provides that
By no later than the date that is 270 days after the date on which an investigation is initiated
under paragraph (1) with respect to any article, the Secretary shall submit to the President a
report on the findings of such investigation with respect to the effect of the importation of
such article in such quantities or under such circumstances upon the national security and,
based on such findings, the recommendations of the Secretary for action or inaction under
this section. If the Secretary finds that such article is being imported into the United States
in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security,
the Secretary shall so advise the President in such report.
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A) (1988). The text of this subsection reads:
Within 90 days after receiving a report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(A) of this
section in which the Secretary finds that an article is being imported into the United States
in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security,
the President shall-
(i) determine whether the President concurs with the finding of the Secretary, and
(ii) if the President concurs, determine the nature and duration of the action that, in the
judgment of the President, must be taken to adjust the imports of the article and its deriva-
tives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.
16. See supra note 10, at 360.
17. See Pub. L. No. 84-86, § 7, 69 Stat. 166 (1955). See also H.R. REP. No. 1761, supra note
11. The impetus for the amendment appears to have been concern over the importation of spe-
cific commodities in large volumes. However, rather than single out such commodities, Congress
chose simply to provide the President with the general power to regulate imports where he de-
[Vol. '11:926
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have been a number of changes in the law since 1955, the most signifi-
cant being the transfer of investigatory powers to the Secretary of
Commerce, the substance of the law remains essentially that fixed in
1955.18
The legislative history reveals that section 232 was intended to be
applied only in cases involving national security. Congress stated spe-
cifically that section 232 was not intended to provide an alternative to
the relief available to domestic industries under the so-called "escape
clause."' 19 Thus, while injury to a domestic industry may be a consid-
eration in a section 232 investigation, remedying that injury is not the
object of such a proceeding. Rather, "[t]he interest to be safeguarded
is the security of the Nation, not the output or profitability of any
plant or industry except as these may be essential to national
security."
20
C. Operation of Section 232
To understand the potential scope of section 232, it is necessary
first to understand something of the mechanics of how the section op-
cided that such imports were having a deleterious effect upon national security. See S. REP. No.
232, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1955); 101 CONG. REC. 5298 (1955) (remarks of Sen. Barkley).
The specific commodities of concern were petroleum, fluorspar, lead, and zinc. See S. REP. No.
232 at 4-5.
18. The most significant amendment to section 232 was enacted in 1958, where for the first
time the factors to be considered in determining whether imports threatened to impair national
security were enumerated. See H.R. REP. No. 1761, supra note 11, at 15. The section became
the present section 232 in 1962, which essentially recodified the previous law. See H.R. REP. No.
1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1962). Section 232 was amended most recently by the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. The most significant change made in 1988 was the
addition of a formal requirement that the Secretary of Defense conduct a separate assessment of
the defense needs with respect to the article in question. See H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 709-13 (1988) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 576]. This requirement, and its implications, will
be discussed further below. Although the 1988 amendment took the form of a total revision of
the section, in fact the current provision is relatively little-changed from that adopted in 1955
and modified in 1958.
19. See H.R. REP. No. 1761, supra note 11, at 13. The House Ways and Means Committee
report on the 1958 amendment stated that
[T]he national security amendment is not an alternative to the means afforded by the escape
clause for providing industries which believe themselves injured a second court in which to
seek relief. Its purpose is a different one - to provide those best able to judge national
security needs, namely, the President ... a way of taking whatever action is needed to avoid
a threat to the national security through imports.
Id.
The "escape clause" referred to is, in its present form, sections 201 et seq. of the Trade Act of
1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53 (1988). Under this section, a domestic industry may obtain relief
from foreign competition, in the form of additional tariffs, quotas, or other measures, if the Inter-
national Trade Commission determines that imports have been a substantial cause of serious
injury to the industry, and if the President determines that such relief is in the national interest.
For an overview of the operation of the escape clause, see J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 541-95 (1986).
20. H.R. REP. No. 1761, supra note 11, at 14.
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erates. Section 232 is administered by the International Trade Admin-
istration ("ITA"), an agency within the U.S. Department of
Commerce. An investigation under section 232 commences upon re-
ceipt by the Secretary of Commerce of a request from "the head of any
department or agency," an application from an "interested party," or
upon the Secretary's own motion. 2' Neither the statute nor the ITA's
regulations define "interested party," but the provision plainly con-
templates the filing of requests by private parties. In the past, investi-
gations have been initiated following receipt of applications both from
individual companies producing a product and, more commonly, from
associations of producers.
22
The Department of Commerce's regulations specify that applica-
tions shall be filed with the Director of the Office of Industrial Re-
source Administration, an office within the International Trade
Administration. An application must provide a great deal of detailed
information regarding the product in question, its effect upon the na-
tional security of the United States, the domestic industry producing
the product, and the effect of imports upon the U.S. industry.23
21. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(l)(A) (1988).
22. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECTS OF IMPORTS OF GLASS-LINED
CHEMICAL PROCESSING EQUIPMENT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY 4 (1982) [hereinafter
GLASS-LINED EQUIPMENT REPORT] (request for investigation filed by single company produc-
ing subject merchandise); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF PLASTIC
INJECTION MOLDING MACHINES ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY I-1 (1989) [hereinafter PIMM
REPORT] (request filed by trade group). It is not clear whether the association need be a formal
body, or whether a filing by an ad hoc group is permissible, but this is essentially a moot ques-
tion, as individual members of a group would clearly have standing to file if they produce the
product in question. It is possible, if improbable, that questions of standing to file a request could
emerge, as the ITA may request information from other interested parties, including, presuma-
bly, parties opposed to the request. See 15 C.F.R. § 3705.7(a) (1989). Such information could
include claims that the requestor was not an interested party within the meaning of the statute.
In such a case the Department of Commerce could apply a definition of "interested party" simi-
lar to that contained in the antidumping and countervailing duty definitional statute which de-
fines interested parties as domestic producers of a product, associations of such producers, or
unions whose members work in the relevant industry. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1988).
23. 15 C.F.R. § 705.4(c) (1989). The specific information which the request must contain
includes:
1. Identification of the applicant;
2. A precise description of the article;
3. A description of the domestic industry affected, including information regarding com-
panies and their plants, locations, capacity, and current output;
4. Statistics regarding imports and domestic production showing both value and
quantity;
5. The nature and degree of competition created by imports;
6. The effect that imports may have upon restoration of domestic production capacity in
the event of a national emergency;
7. Employment and any specialized skills involved in production of the article
domestically;
8. The extent to which the national economy, employment, investment, specialized
skills, and productive capacity are or will be adversely affected by imports;
9. Governmental revenues which will be lost;
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The statute provides "heads of agencies" the right to file requests
for investigations as well.24 This method of initiation has been used
frequently. Of the twenty section 232 investigations conducted since
1962, thirteen resulted from applications by companies or associations,
four from requests by agency heads, and three from Presidential
requests.
25
Upon receipt of a request or application, the statute requires the
ITA "immediately" to commence an investigation. 26 Neither the stat-
ute nor the agency regulations specify what is meant by "immedi-
ately." In past cases, notice of initiation of an investigation has
generally followed within one month of the filing of an application or
the placement of a request. 27 The various agencies charged with ad-
ministering section 232 typically publish notices of initiation in the
Federal Register. 28 The ITA is also required to notify the Secretary of
Defense immediately of the initiation of an investigation. 29
After commencing a section 232 investigation, the ITA is required
to consult with the Secretary of Defense "regarding the methodologi-
10. Uses of the article for national security purposes, including data on contracts and
sub-contracts; and
11. Any other relevant information.
Id.
From these requirements, it is clear that the preparation of a section 232 application is a
substantial task requiring the accumulation of large amounts of data. If the domestic industry is
composed of more than one producer, cooperation is probably necessary to gather and explain
the required data. This raises the obvious problem of inter-firm cooperation where a domestic
producer is related to a foreign exporter, and is not willing to assist the rest of the industry by
providing the needed data for an application. There is no legal means to compel cooperation, so
that industry-wide consensus could be considered a practical prerequisite for the filing of an
application. On the other hand, successful applications have been filed in cases where a substan-
tial part of the domestic industry was related to foreign producers, as was true in the investiga-
tion of antifriction bearings. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF
ANTI-FRICTION BEARINGS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY 11-2-3 (1988) [hereinafter BEARINGS
REPORT].
24. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(l)(A) (1988). The statute does not specify the officials entitled to file
requests under this section; all requests from agency heads in the past have been by Secretaries.
See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY 13-15
(1984) [hereinafter EFFECT OF IMPORTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY]. Although not stated explic-
itly, the President obviously qualifies as a "head of agency."
25. See EFFECT OF IMPORTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 24, at 13-15.
26. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(l)(A) (1988).
27. See EFFECT OF IMPORTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 24, at 13-15.
28. Id.
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(B) (1988). This provision was added to section 232 in 1988. See
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, § 1501(a). Before the
change, the ITA and the President were already required to consider the defense-needs aspects of
the imports in question. The amendment formally brought the Secretary of Defense into the
process by requiring the ITA to notify the Secretary of Defense of the initiation of a section 232
investigation, and by requiring the Secretary of Defense in turn to provide a written defense-
needs assessment, if requested by the ITA. See H.R. REP. No. 576 supra note 18, at 710-11.
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cal and policy questions" raised in the investigation. 30 The Secretary
is further directed to seek information from, and consult with, other
appropriate officers of the United States.3 ' The ITA cannot, however,
publicize communications from other government agencies, or infor-
mation received from foreign governments. 32 In addition to advice,
the ITA may seek other forms of assistance from other government
agencies in conducting the investigation. 33 The ITA may also, "if it is
appropriate," hold public hearings, or otherwise afford interested par-
ties an opportunity to present information and comments relevant to
the investigation.
34
The ITA must complete its investigation and submit a report to
the President within 270 days of the date of initiation. 3" In its report,
the agency must describe its findings and submit its recommendations.
Specifically, if the agency determines that the article in question is be-
ing imported into the United States in such quantities or under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security, it must so
advise the President. 36 The agency is required to publish in the Fed-
eral Register any portion of its report that does not contain confiden-
tial information. 3
7
Upon receipt of the ITA's report, the President has ninety days to
determine whether he agrees with its findings and to decide what ac-
tion, if any, to take. If he determines to act, he must implement such
action within fifteen days of the date of his determination. Within
thirty days of his determination, the President must submit a written
statement to Congress explaining the basis for his decision. 38 The
President is also required to submit a report to Congress annually re-
garding the overall operation of section 232. 39
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(A)(i) (1988); see also 15 C.F.R. § 705.7(d) (1989).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1988); see also 15 C.F.R. § 705.7(d) (1989).
32. 15 C.F.R. § 705.7(d) (1989).
33. Id.
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1988); see also 15 C.F.R. § 705.8(a) (1989).
35. The addition of time limits to section 232 occurred as part of the amendments to the law
made in 1988. See Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418 § 1501, 102
Stat. 1107, 1207 (1988). There formerly was no requirement regarding the time within which
either the ITA or the President must act. The addition of time limits thus ensured private parties
to section 232 proceedings that a resolution of the proceedings would occur within a relatively
restricted time. In addition, the shorter time limits arguably increased the effectiveness of section
232 as a means of safeguarding the national security, by ensuring that an investigation was not so
prolonged that the relevant domestic industry had already suffered irreparable injury by the time
the investigation was completed.
36. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A) (1988).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(B) (1988); see also 15 C.F.R. § 705.10(c) (1989).
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (1988).
39. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(e)(2) (1988).
[Vol. 11:926
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Actions by the President under section 232 are not normally sub-
ject to further review or action. However, any action taken by the
President with respect to imports of petroleum or petroleum products
may be overridden by a disapproval resolution by either house of Con-
gress.40 The constitutionality of this provision is questionable in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha.
4 1
D. Application of Section 232
The purpose of a section 232 investigation is to determine whether
imports are entering the United States in such quantities, or under
such circumstances, as to threaten to impair the national security. 42
Significantly, the phrase "threaten to impair the national security" is
neither defined nor discussed in the statute or in the agency's regula-
tions. Nor is there any meaningful discussion of the standard in the
legislative history.4 3 This omission highlights the extent to which de-
terminations under section 232 were intended to be discretionary, and
emphasizes the flexibility accorded both the ITA and the President in
making such determinations.
Despite the paucity of guidance for interpreting the phrase
"threaten to impair the national security," the statute does provide a
detailed list of factors for the ITA and the President to consider in
making their determinations. An examination of these factors will
thus serve as a starting point for interpreting the phrase. This analysis
then can be refined further by reviewing the factors actually consid-
ered, in varying degrees, by the ITA in an investigation.
The statute provides that the ITA and the President "shall, in the
light of the requirements of national security and without excluding
other relevant factors," consider the following factors:
1. Domestic production of the article needed for projected national
defense requirements;
2. The capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements;
3. Existing and anticipated availabilities of the human resources,
40. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(f) (1988).
41. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (provision in
statute for Congressional veto of Presidential determination held unconstitutional).
42. See text accompanying note 14, supra. Before 1958, the statute referred only to articles
imported "in such quantities" as to threaten to impair national security. The second provision
was added in that year to address situations in which the conditions under which imports oc-
curred, rather than the quantities of such imports, created the threat to national security. See
H.R. REP. No. 1761, supra note It, at 15.
43. Indeed, the only significant reference to what was meant by "national security" is a state-
ment in a floor debate in 1955 that the section is intended to address imports of articles that are
essential to national defense. See 101 CONG. REC. 5298 (1955) (remarks of Senator Barkley).
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products, raw materials, and other supplies and services essential to the
national defense;
4. The requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies
and services, including the investment, exploration, and development
needed to ensure such growth; and
5. The importation of goods in terms of their quantities, availabili-
ties, character, and use; and their effect on the ability of United States
industries to satisfy national defense needs. 44
The statute also provides that, in considering these factors, the ITA
and the President should recognize the close connection between eco-
nomic welfare and national security, so that they should consider the
impact of imports upon individual domestic industries. The ITA and
the President are also directed to consider the loss of jobs or skills,
governmental revenues, or investment resulting from the displacement
of domestic products by excessive imports. The ITA and the Presi-
dent may of course consider other relevant factors as well. 45
These factors reveal that, although "national security" is not de-
fined in the statute, the focus is upon national defense. Most of the
factors to be reviewed apply to products having specific military uses.
Similarly, the statute requires the ITA to consult with the Secretary of
Defense,46 who must make an assessment of the defense requirements
for the article in question if the Secretary of Commerce so requests. 47
Beyond this, the legislative history indicates that the ITA and the
President should, in determining whether imports threaten to impair
the national security, consider in particular the role of imports of the
product during periods of national emergency, 48 a still narrower stan-
dard. The statute does encourage the ITA and the President to take
into account the connection between economic welfare and national
security, 49 an exhortation which, if followed, could allow these parties
to define "national security" more broadly than the enumerated fac-
tors would suggest. On balance, however, the statute, with the accom-
panying legislative history, appears to define national security
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (1988); see also 15 C.F.R. § 705.4(a) (1989). The House Ways and
Means Committee report regarding the amendment by which this part of the statute was added
to the law in 1958 stated that these factors were intended to "guide" the President in determining
whether imports were threatening to impair the national security. The report stated further that
"in considering factors affecting national security, attention should be given to the continued
accessibility, in periods of national emergency, of imports from areas close to the United States."
H.R. REP. No. 1761, supra note 11, at 15.
45. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (1988).
46. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(A) (1988).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (1988). See also S. REP. No. 71, supra note 8, at 135-36.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 1761, supra note 11, at 15.
49. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (1988).
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essentially in terms of military requirements for the product in
question.
The best guide to the scope of section 232 and, in particular, to the
manner in which the phrase "national security" has been interpreted,
is the results of individual ITA investigations, along with subsequent
Presidential determinations whether to act on the basis of those re-
sults. As the following examination will reveal, the ITA has inter-
preted section 232 fairly narrowly, equating national security with
national defense. Moreover, actions following affirmative findings by
the ITA have been rather rare, indicating that, as a political matter,
the United States prefers not to take direct, unilateral action under
section 232. This conclusion is confirmed by a review of the few cases
in which the President has taken action under section 232 to limit
imports.
The starting point for an ITA investigation is the factors listed in
the statute and in the ITA's regulations, such as national defense and
essential civilian requirements, the domestic production needed to
meet such needs, the capacity of the domestic industry, and the quan-
tity and quality of imports.50 Where necessary or appropriate, the
ITA will also consider additional factors unique to the product in
question. 5
In the actual conduct of an investigation, the ITA must first deter-
mine the importance of the article to national security. To make this
determination, the ITA examines the use of the article in both defense
and essential civilian applications. 52 The ITA will examine particular
military applications of the product, such as its incorporation in indi-
vidual weapons systems.53 Past ITA studies have been less specific as
to what are considered "essential civilian applications," but have
noted where a product is "basic and vital to the health, welfare and
50. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF CHROMIUM, MANGANESE,
AND SILICON FERROALLOYS AND RELATED MATERIALS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY 4-5
(1982) [hereinafter FERROALLOYS REPORT].
51. See id. at 5-6. In the ferroalloys investigation, for example, the ITA stated that it would
also consider chromium and manganese ore requirements, steel capacity, and surplus blast fur-
nace capacity in making its determination. These were factors of a type not enumerated in the
statute, but which the ITA found had a direct bearing upon the question of whether imports of
ferroalloys threatened to impair the national security of the United States. Id. Similarly, in its
investigation of plastic injection molding machines, the ITA noted that developments and condi-
tions in other sectors of the economy, such as robots, molds, and other products used in conjunc-
tion with injection molding machines, could be relevant to the investigation. See PIMM
REPORT, supra note 22, at 11-6.
52. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at 1-3; PIMM REPORT, supra note 22, at ES-I, IV
1-6.
53. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at 1-3-4.
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thus the security of the United States."'54 The ITA will commonly rely
upon Department of Defense studies and information, as well as other
sources, in making this determination. 55
The ITA may next divide the articles covered by the application or
request for investigation into specific product categories. It may do so
on the basis of chemical composition, uses, 56 or physical characteris-
tics. 57 Such a division is significant, as the ITA will then analyze the
role of each product in the national security, 58 and will make an in-
dependent determination of the impact of imports and an individual
recommendation regarding each product category. 59
The ITA will next calculate total available supply of the product
with anticipated demand during a "specified national security emer-
gency."6 ° The ITA defines "supply" as the sum of (1) domestic mobil-
ization capacity; (2) importer and domestic inventories; and (3)
reliable imports. 61 The aim of this step is to determine the supply of
the product upon which the United States could depend in a national
security emergency. Demand for the product is normally determined
through an input/output analysis of end-use product requirements
contained in the 1984 Stockpile Study by the National Security Coun-
cil. 62 The purpose of this step is to determine whether supply
54. GLASS-LINED EQUIPMENT REPORT, supra note 22, at 9.
55. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at 1-3.
56. See FERROALLOYS REPORT, supra note 50, at 13-14.
57. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at 11-18-23. In the investigation of antifriction
bearings, the ITA divided the merchandise into two general classes, regular precision bearings
and superprecision bearings, and then subdivided these classes into a number of subcategories,
such as ball bearings under 30mm, ball bearings 30-100mm, tapered roller bearings, etc. See id.
at ES-3. Similarly, in the ferroalloys investigation, the ITA divided the merchandise into a
number of different products, such as high carbon ferrochromium, high carbon ferromanganese,
chromium metal, etc. See FERROALLOYS REPORT, supra note 50, at 24-41.
58. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at 11-18-23.
59. See id. at VII-l-12.
60. See id. at ES-1.
61. Id. at ES-2. The ITA has noted that it defines supply as (1) the ability of the domestic
industry to expand production during emergency conditions; (2) the ability to convert the ex-
isting stock of the product from civilian to military use; and (3) reliable imports. The agency
bases its estimates of the ability of the domestic industry to expand production upon a survey of
the capabilities of the leading manufacturers of the product. See PIMM REPORT, supra note 22
at ES-1-2. In considering the possibility of expansion of production, the ITA will attempt to
identify the factors necessary for expansion and possible obstacles to expansion, such as shortages
of raw materials, equipment, and skilled labor. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at VI-8-
18. Of particular interest is whether plants that produced the product have recently closed, so
that production could expand by reopening them. See id. at VI-18.
Another obvious component of supply is inventory. Such inventory may include inventories
held by domestic producers and consumers, see FERROALLOYS REPORT, supra note 50, at 42, as
well as any supplies of the good contained in the National Defense Stockpile. Id. at 49-5 1.
62. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at ES-2; PIMM REPORT, supra note 22, at 1-2.
Where the NSC Stockpile Study does not provide direct information for the specific product
concerned, however, the ITA has derived demand by taking study data for a product related to
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shortfalls of the product would occur during a "national security
emergency," which is essentially a period of mobilization followed by
a conventional war. In recent investigations, the ITA has defined the
period of national emergency as a one-year mobilization followed by
the first year of a conventional war of indefinite length. 63 For those
products where a shortfall is identified, the ITA's final step is to deter-
mine whether imports have been a significant cause of the domestic
industry's inability to meet national security requirements. Beyond
examining just this static picture, however, the ITA will also analyze
current and prospective market trends to evaluate domestic ability to
meet national security requirements in the future. 64
To determine supply, the ITA will examine the structure of the
worldwide industry and the competitive forces and trends at work
within the industry, with an emphasis on sources of exports to the
United States. Of special importance is the level of import penetration
in the United States. 65 In this way, the ITA determines external
sources of supply, and the reliability of those sources. 66 The ITA con-
ducts a detailed examination of shipments, consumption, and trade in
the relevant product.67 It will also consider what, if any, substitutions
for the product under investigation are available, 68 and whether and to
the product in question and extrapolating. Thus, in the injection molding machines investiga-
tion, the ITA utilized study data on plastic resin requirements, as plastic resin is the main raw
material for plastics, the product produced by plastic injection molding machines, and calculated
from this the number of plastic injection molding machines that would be necessary to process
this amount of resin. The ITA also relied upon independent estimates of the total amount of
plastic resin used for military purposes, information obtained from interviews with industry offi-
cials regarding the extent of their defense-related operations, and Defense Department projec-
tions. See id at 1-2-3.
63. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 22, at VI-1; PIMM REPORT, supra note 22, at VIII-I.
The ITA formerly used Scenario 3A of the Stockpile Study, which contemplated a one-year
mobilization effort followed by a three-year war. The agency has more recently altered its ap-
proach by using a scenario based on a one-year mobilization period followed by the first year of a
war of indefinite length, as it believes that this scenario is more realistic than the gradual in-
creases over a three-year period contemplated by Scenario 3-A. Id. at VIII-1. As will be dis-
cussed below, whether this scenario continues to be realistic is debatable.
64. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at VI-1; PIMM REPORT, supra note 22, at ES-2.
65. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at 11-1-7.
66. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at V-l-1 1; FERROALLOYS REPORT, supra note 50,
at 11. In determining the reliability of imports, the ITA has turned to the Department of State to
identify sources that can be considered reliable. In making this determination, the State Depart-
ment will consider both the political and logistical reliability of the exporting country. See id. at
11. In at least one study, it was assumed that no imports could reach the United States by sea.
Thus, only imports from Canada were considered reliable. See PIMM REPORT, supra note 22, at
VII-5. There is no official procedure for participation by private parties in the State Depart-
ment's determination regarding reliability, so that this determination, which is of great impor-
tance in the ITA's vital determination of available supply, represents essentially a variable
outside the control of private parties.
67. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at V-I-lI.
68. See GLASS-LINED EQUIPMENT REPORT, supra note 22, at 6-7.
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what extent the industry can shift production to products that are the
subject of the investigation.
69
The ITA will then examine the structure and condition of the do-
mestic industry, including ownership (in particular, whether firms are
foreign-owned), shipments, and employment.' 0 The ITA will then ex-
amine in detail the competitive factors relevant to foreign producers
that affect the domestic industry's ability to satisfy national security
requirements. These factors include the structure of individual coun-
try industries (concentrated v. diffuse), the existence of protected mar-
kets or strong domestic sales bases, and developments such as
international rationalization of production.7 The ITA also will ex-
amine competition from other products as potential substitutes.72 The
ITA will pay particular attention to the profitability of the domestic
industry, and thus its ability to generate future investment in both re-
search and new production facilities. The agency will also examine
past investment in capital facilities and in research and development. 73
In addition, the ITA will examine sources of raw materials.'
4 It
69. See FERROALLOYS REPORT, supra note 50, at 16-17. In the Ferroalloys Report, the ITA
noted that the flexibility to shift production into necessary areas "can be extremely important
during an emergency," so "the degree of flexibility available can have direct consequence on the
assessment of the national security threat as certain operations may be able to compensate for
decreases in production from other areas." Id. at 16. With respect to ferroalloys, for example,
the ITA found that there were 101 ferroalloy furnaces in the United States, of which eighty-two
could be used to produce more than one type of product. Id. at 17. Because of the importance of
flexibility in production shifting to its assessment of the national security threat, the .ITA will
examine not just current flexibility, but also potential trends towards either more or less ability to
shift production among products. The ITA will also take into account the negative aspects of
production flexibility, such as higher levels of off-specification production and the loss of the
economies generated by continuous production of a single product. Id.
70. See, e.g., BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at 11-9-15. With respect to foreign owner-
ship, the ITA has noted that "[t]hough unlikely, it is conceivable that in times of emergency,
companies owned by foreign firms may receive directions to operate in a manner not fully consis-
tent with U.S. national security interests .... " FERROALLOYS REPORT, supra note 50, at 47.
Therefore the ITA considers foreign ownership of U.S. firms in calculating available supply in a
national security emergency.
71. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at 111-1-8. The ITA will undertake a competitive
analysis of the foreign producers similar to that performed regarding the domestic industry.
Among the factors considered, besides such obvious ones as availability of raw materials and
labor costs, are the political situation in the country, its infrastructure, effect of environmental
regulations on costs, and government support of the industry, including tariff levels for the prod-
uct in question. See FERROALLOYS REPORT, supra note 50, at 52-55.
72. See GLASS-LINED EQUIPMENT REPORT, supra note 22, at 6-7.
73. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at 111-8-13.
74. See FERROALLOYS REPORT, supra note 50, at 15; BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at
111-14-16. Of obvious importance is whether key raw materials must also be imported, and
whether the sources of such imports are themselves dependable. To the extent that the domestic
industry depends upon imported raw materials, examination of imports of the product under
investigation alone may result in an understatement on the vulnerability of the domestic industry
during a national security emergency. In the Antifriction Bearings investigation, for example,
the ITA found that import penetration figures understated the reliance of the United States on
external sources of supply for antifriction bearings because the U.S. industry relied heavily upon
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will analyze the effects of price, lead time for delivery, and service
upon competitiveness. 71 Taken together, these data allow the ITA to
reach a conclusion regarding the overall competitiveness of the United
States industry, and the probable effects of the competitive situation
on the future of the domestic industry.76 The ITA will consider rele-
vant governmental programs, both those that affect industry competi-
tiveness directly, such as Department of Defense procurement
regulations and adjustment assistance, 77 and laws and regulations that
may have more indirect, but just as important effects, such as environ-
mental regulations.
78
The final step in the ITA's methodology is its national security
assessment. The agency first identifies mobilization requirements in a
national security emergency. 79 From this, the ITA estimates total re-
quirements for the product. The ITA then derives "mobilization ca-
pacity," representing the ability to satisfy mobilization requirements
from domestic production, inventories, and secure imports. 80
Although the ITA conducts the investigation, it normally depends
upon other agencies for much of its data, and may even depend upon
them for key determinations. As was noted above, the Department of
Defense has an official function under the statute through the require-
ment that it provide a defense assessment of the product in question.
The ITA will also generally consult with other agencies on key areas,
such as projected supply, the availability of skilled labor or the factors
imported bearing-quality steel as the main input into the finished product. See BEARINGS RE-
PORT, supra note 23, at 111-16.
To make the determination of the vulnerability of the domestic industry to imports of raw
materials, the ITA will apply the same mobilization scenario used for the products under investi-
gation and the U.S. Department State's factors of reliability for such imports. See FERROALLOYS
REPORT, supra note 50, at 5. The ITA will also of course consider domestic sources for the raw
materials, and where those sources are inferior to sources abroad, whether the United States
could nonetheless rely upon domestic sources, and what the costs of development of these re-
sources would be. See id. at 15; see also BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at 111-16.
75. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at 111-17-23.
76. See id. at 111-23.
77. See id. at IV-1-4; GLASS-LINED EQUIPMENT REPORT, supra note 22, at 6. The govern-
ment program having the most obvious effect upon imports is the level of U.S. tariffs. See id. at
6. Other programs exerting a direct effect upon the domestic industry are Department of De-
fense procurement programs, such as Defense Production Act Title III funds to support develop-
ment of production or, most importantly, Federal Acquisition Regulations that may require the
Department of Defense to purchase the product in question from domestic sources only. See
BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at IV-1.
.78. See FERROALLOYS REPORT, supra note 50, at 16. Among the programs and policies
considered in past investigations are environmental regulations, U.S. antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws, antitrust laws, the provision of trade adjustment assistance to firms and work-
ers adversely affected by imports, export controls, export promotion activities, and the U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at IV 2-4.
79. See, e.g., BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at VI-1-2.
80. See id. at VI-4-18.
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affecting the competitiveness of the U.S. industry."'
Having completed its investigation, the ITA can then compare
needs and availabilities to determine whether shortfalls exist. It can
also determine the extent to which these shortfalls are the result of
imports. To assess the relationship between supply shortfall and im-
ports, the ITA examines the magnitude of imports relative to the total
market, i.e., import penetration, and trends in imports and domestic
capacity. 82 The ITA accordingly makes its formal findings, states
whether it has concluded that imports have entered the United States
in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to im-
pair national security, and recommends to the President what action,
if any, should be taken. 3 The ITA has stated that, in deciding what
recommendations to make, its primary aim is to alleviate projected
shortfalls so that national security needs can be met, and that the rec-
ommendations proposed must embody the most efficient means of sat-
isfying this requirement. 84 The agency's recommendations are not
limited to whether or not imports should be restricted; it is also able to
recommend other, non-import-related measures if it believes such
steps will remedy the problem. 8
5
81. See, e.g, FERROALLOYS REPORT, supra note 50, at 10. In that investigation, the ITA
consulted with the Department of Labor regarding labor trends and the availability of the skilled
labor necessary for the ferroalloys industry; the Department of the Treasury regarding the reve-
nue effect of imports and the effect of currency fluctuations and exchange rates on competitive-
ness; the United States Trade Representative and the Council of Economic Advisers regarding
the possible impact of any action limiting imports upon the U.S. economy in general; the Depart-
ment of the Interior regarding domestic and foreign sources of the ores that are the raw materials
for ferroalloys; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency regarding the projected supply
of ferroalloys that would be available during an emergency. See id.
82. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23, at VII-i. Among the factors the ITA has treated
as indicating that imports are a cause of the shortfall are declines in domestic shipments (both by
volume and value), declines in exports, increases in import volume or value, and increases in
import penetration. The ITA will also consider whether U.S. producers have left the market in
the recent past. See id. at VII-4. Even if domestic shipments have increased, increases in con-
sumption and imports greater than the growth in domestic production may serve to link imports
and the shortfall. See id. at VII-6.
83. See id., at VII-13.
84. See FERROALLOYS REPORT, supra note 50, at 65. The ITA applies the following criteria
in making its recommendations:
1. The primary purpose of the remedy proposed must be to alleviate the shortfall to
meet national security needs.
2. The remedy must result in the maintenance of domestic production at levels sufficient
to satisfy demand that cannot be filled from inventories and reliable imports.
3. The proposed remedy must incorporate U.S. trade policy goals to the greatest extent
possible.
4. The proposed remedy must represent the lowest possible direct and indirect costs of
action.
5. The proposed remedy must be feasible.
Id.
85. See, e.g., FERROALLOYS REPORT, supra note 50, at 65-67. Recommendations that would
affect imports directly include recommendations for the imposition of quotas, tariffs, or
breakpoint tariffs on imports of the product under investigation, or the elimination of duty-free
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The President is entirely free to accept or reject the ITA's findings
and recommendations. The statute states that the President shall de-
cide whether he agrees with the ITA's findings. If the President agrees
with an affirmative determination, he shall determine the nature and
duration of the action to be taken. However, the statute modifies this
requirement by explicitly providing that the President shall decide
what action, in his judgment, is necessary to adjust the imports of the
article so that these imports will not threaten to impair the national
security.8 6 Thus, the decision whether to act is left entirely to the dis-
cretion of the President. There is no judicial review of this decision,
and, with the possible exception of decisions relating to petroleum im-
ports, no provision for overriding action by Congress outside of the
normal legislative process.8 7 Therefore, despite the elaborate machin-
ery for investigation, the ultimate decision is that of the President
alone, and he is free to make it on any grounds, including avowedly
political ones, that he sees fit.
E. Actions Possible Under Section 232
As was noted above, the President has the power to determine
what action is necessary to "adjust" imports to the necessary levels.88
The statute does not specify what means the President may use. Obvi-
ous measures, however, would include the imposition of additional
tariffs, quotas, "import fees," licenses, or even outright bans on impor-
tation.8 9 An arguably less disruptive, but equally direct, means of lim-
iting imports has been through voluntary restraining agreements
("VRAs") with selected exporters to limit the flow of imports into the
United States.90 In Other cases, where the ITA has found a shortfall,
treatment for the product under the Generalized System of Preferences. Id. at 66-67. In the
ferroalloys investigation, the ITA recommended instead that the United States upgrade the Na-
tional Defense Stockpile holdings of products for which it had found a shortfall as the most
efficient and least disruptive means of ensuring that the United States possessed sufficient stocks
of these products. Id. at 67. Even if the ITA finds a shortfall, it may recommend that the
President defer action until he is able to assess whether other government programs, such as
Federal Acquisition Regulations requiring the Department of Defense to purchase the product
from domestic sources only, has alleviated the problem. See BEARINGS REPORT, supra note 23,
at VII-13.
86. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A) (1988).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 40 and 41.
88. See supra text accompanying note 15.
89. See, e.g., FERROALLOyS REPORT, supra note 50, at 65-67 (discussion of imposition of
quotas, import duties, breakpoint tariffs, and termination of GSP status).
90. See Statement by the President announcing decision to seek Voluntary Restraint Agree-
ments on machine tool imports. 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1654 (Dec. 16, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter Presidential Statement dated December 16, 1986]. The President stated that the United
States had concluded VRAs with Taiwan and Japan on certain specified products. At the same
time, he announced that the Department of Defense would also implement an Action Plan to
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but recommended deferral of action, the President has chosen not to
take action to restrict imports until the effect of other U.S. government
actions intended to remedy the situation could be observed. 91 Presi-
dential power under section 232 is subject to some restrictions; how-
ever, the section does empower the President to impose controls on
domestically produced goods, either through monetary mechanisms or
quantitative devices.92
Although section 232 represents a potent weapon of trade policy, it
has rarely been used. Between 1962 and the present, eighteen section
232 investigations have been conducted.93 In nine of these, either the
integrate U.S. machine tool manufacturers in the defense procurement process, and that the
government would also provide funds to finance research and development in the machine tool
sector. The President also stated that the government would consider whether antitrust laws
could permit the various companies in the industry to cooperate in research and development
activities. Finally, the President noted that, although no formal agreements had been concluded
with West Germany and Switzerland, the Secretary of Commerce had informed these countries
that their exports of machine tools to the United States should not exceed certain limits, and that
the United States would be prepared to take unilateral action if these limits were breached.
The United States subsequently concluded VRAs with Japan and Taiwan to limit imports of
machine tools from those countries. In each case, the limit for a specific product was set as a
percentage of apparent U.S. consumption during a stated period. See Arrangement between the
Coordination Council for North American Affairs and the American Institute in Taiwan Con-
cerning Trade in Certain Machine Tools at 2; Agreed Minutes between the United States and
Japan at 2. The actual mechanism for control was an agreement by the exporting country not to
allow exports without an export license. Id.
The use of VRAs by the United States in international trade has been the subject of great
controversy. See, e.g., J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 8, at 615-22. It is interesting to note
that, in the case of the agreement between the United States and Japan, the governments dealt
directly with one another, so that there can be no doubt that the agreement represented an
agreement between governments, rather than between the United States and individual Japanese
exporters. Whether such agreements are truly voluntary on the part of foreign exporters is a
separate issue; in the case of the agreement with Taiwan, the Taiwanese machine tool industry
has made it clear that it believed the presentation of the agreement was a fait accompli on the
part of the United States, and that it was accepted only because the alternative could have been
even more restrictive quotas or higher tariffs.
The machine tool case represents the first use by the President of VRAs. The statute contains
no explicit authority to make such agreements. The Senate passed an amendment to section 232
in 1988 that would have provided explicit authority for the conclusion of VRAs as an action
under section 232. In conference, however, the amendment was dropped. The legislative history
makes it clear that Congress considers the authority to adopt VRAs to reside with the President
under his general authority under section 232, so that no additional authority was necessary. See
H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 18, at 712. At the same time, it is significant that Congress
avoided providing the President with formal authority to conclude VRAs, so that the constitu-
tional status of such agreements remains debatable.
91. See Notice of Termination of Investigation: Antifriction Bearings, 51 Fed. Reg. 14,470
(Dep't Comm. 1986).
92. See Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F.Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1980).
93. The products that have been the subjects of section 232 investigations include manganese
and chromium ferroalloys; tungsten mill products; antifriction bearings; watches, movements
and parts; miniature and instrument precision ball bearings; EHV power circuit breakers and
EHV power transformers and reactors; oil; nuts, bolts, and large screws of iron or steel; glass-
lined chemical processing equipment; machine tools; plastic injection molding machines; and
uranium. Some products, including chromium and manganese ferroalloys, antifriction bearings,
and oil, have been the subject of more than one investigation.
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administering authority or the President concluded that imports did
not threaten to impair national security.94 In two investigations, in-
volving chromium, manganese, and silicon ferroalloys and related
materials and antifriction bearings, the ITA determined that imports
did threaten national security. In the ferroalloys case, the President
determined that imports did not pose a threat, in light of action taken
to remove these materials from the Generalized System of Preferences
list and to upgrade the stockpiles of these products. 95 With respect to
antifriction bearings, the ITA found a threat, but recommended no
action in light of changes in the Department of Defense's procurement
regulations that would restrict defense purchases to domestically pro-
duced bearings. 96 In an investigation of machine tools, the ITA found
a threat, and the President took action in the form of negotiation of
voluntary restraining agreements to limit exports to the United
States.
97
The only product regarding which the United States has taken uni-
lateral action is petroleum. In 1957, a system of supplemental fees
upon petroleum imports was imposed; 9 8 this system was later disman-
tled.99 However, section 232 was used to continue to ban imports of
petroleum from Libya, on grounds that such import threatened the
national security of the United States.10°  This last action is a vivid
illustration of the extent to which section 232 is subject to political
considerations and influences.101
This record is one of very conservative application of section 232.
In light of the extremely narrow definition of "national security" em-
ployed by the ITA, and thus the infrequency with which that agency
has in fact found that imports threatened to impair the national secur-
ity, such conservatism appears unwarranted. Precisely because the
ITA applies such a stringent standard, the assumption should be that,
in cases where the ITA does find a threat, that threat is quite severe
indeed. In such a circumstance, a valid presumption would be that
decisive action by the President is necessary to assure that the threat
does not transmute into actual harm to the national security.
94. See BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMIN., OFF. OF INDUS. RESOURCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS (1989).
95. See Presidential Decision on the Impact of Ferroalloy Imports on the National Security, 49
Fed. Reg. 21,391, 21, 392 (Dep't Comm. 1984).
96. See Notice of Termination of Investigation: Antifriction Bearings, supra note 91.
97. See Presidential Statement dated December 16, 1986, supra note 90.
98. See Proclamation No. 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 1781 (1957).
99. See Proclamation No. 5141, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,929 (1983).
100. See id.
101. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 8, at 925.
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Yet, as discussed above, in those cases involving products other
than petroleum, the President has declined to take any concrete ac-
tion, with the possible exception of the insistence on the conclusion of
voluntary restraint agreements in the Machine Tools case. Rather, the
President has adopted the position that no further action was war-
ranted until the effect of other, less-disruptive measures became clear.
In fact, in neither the Antifriction Bearings nor the Ferroalloys case has
the President taken any further action. Given the implied seriousness
of the threat, in light of the ITA's reluctance to find a threat at all, one
may question whether such a policy represents a sufficiently diligent
application of the law.
F. Comments on Section 232
In theory, section 232 represents a powerful instrument of U.S.
foreign and trade policy. In fact, section 232 has been invoked very
rarely. Therefore, any hope by a domestic industry that it can obtain
meaningful relief from import competition under section 232 is proba-
bly misplaced. This does not mean, however, that section 232 has no
useful purpose for such industries; request of a section 232 investiga-
tion can serve to focus governmental attention upon the problems of a
particular industry, and it can lead to ameliorating action other than
direct adjustment of imports under section 232. Such action occurred
in the Antifriction Bearings case, where the Department of Defense
adopted regulations restricting purchases of certain types of bearings
to domestic sources, and the Ferroalloys case, where the domestic in-
dustry received at least marginal relief when various ferroalloy prod-
ucts were removed from the eligible list of the Generalized System of
Preferences.
The application of section 232 has always been avowedly political
in nature. This in itself is not necessarily a bad thing. Although the
trend in the United States has been towards the "legalization" of gov-
ernmental action, so that action is taken on the basis of allegedly ob-
jective criteria, the determinations involved in a section 232
proceeding are inextricably intertwined with considerations of foreign
policy and national security so that it would be difficult to restrict the
President's power in ways that would not potentially violate the
Constitution.
That section 232 is inherently political in interpretation and appli-
cation cannot obscure or explain the lacuna that exists at the very
heart of the law, namely, the definition of national security. As was
noted above, the statute carefully does not define what is meant by
"national security." In fact, as was discussed above, the ITA and the
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President have defined "national security" in a very narrow, technical
manner. Briefly put, "national security" in the context of imports re-
fers to the ability of the United States to mobilize for and fight a con-
ventional war. Although the statute does exhort the President to
consider the national security aspects of economic welfare as well, the
ITA has interpreted the statute in a purely mechanical fashion in this
respect.
This interpretation, and with it section 232, is on the threshold of
becoming obsolete, unless a new approach to what constitutes national
security is created. The ITA has explicitly defined national security in
terms of military needs. Although the exact details of the scenario on
which the ITA bases its estimate of national security needs for a prod-
uct are often classified, it is known that the ITA calculates national
security needs for a product on the basis of one year of military mobili-
zation, followed by one year of conventional war. 10 2 Against whom
such a conventional war would be waged is unstated, but it is reason-
able to assume that the war contemplated would be fought in Central
Europe against the forces of the Warsaw Pact. This represents a rea-
sonable assumption, as such a scenario would provide the most realis-
tic "worst case" for military needs.
The problems with this scenario have become evident in the last
few months. Although one hesitates to make sweeping pronounce-
ments on the basis of recent events, it appears that the Warsaw Pact
represents a reduced potential military threat to the United States.
Specifically, given current and probable future conditions in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, a conventional war between the United
States and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe is exceedingly un-
likely. 10 3 Therefore, any definition of national security based upon
military needs in such a war is premised upon a scenario that does not
provide a reasonable measure of national security needs.
Three alternative approaches to national security within the con-
text of section 232 are possible. The first is to continue to apply the
current test, where national security is defined in terms of defense
needs for the product in question using the current scenario.
Although the actual occurrence upon which the scenario is based may
be unlikely, it can be argued that this scenario represents a conserva-
tive estimate of U.S. national security requirements. Moreover, this
approach has the benefits of consistency with past ITA experience and
practice.
102. See supra text accompanying note 63.
103. See, e.g., Goshko & Cody, Sheverdnadze to Visit NATO Amid Review of Soviet Threat,
Washington Post, Dec. 15, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
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An alternative approach would be to continue to define national
security in terms of defense needs of the product, but to alter the sce-
nario under which those needs are calculated. One such alternative
scenario might be limited to United States involvement in a ground
war against local countries in the Middle East; another could be
United States intervention in a civil war in one or several Latin Ameri-
can countries. The choice of the best scenario under this approach is
not the proper function of an article of this type. This approach has
the obvious benefit of being more realistic, at least under current con-
ditions. It should be noted, however, that implementation of this ap-
proach would have one predicted effect. Because the military
requirements of the United States in one of these lesser scenarios
would almost certainly be smaller than those present in a large-scale
conventional war, it is more likely that no shortfall of supply would be
found, and thus no adjustment recommended. Under these condi-
tions, section 232 could be expected to be applied even less often than
it has been in the past.
The third, and most radical, approach is to redefine national secur-
ity in terms of economic security. Thus, national security would be
defined not in terms of ability to fight a war, but to compete interna-
tionally. Congress has given at least limited support to this approach
to national security by directing the President to consider the relation-
ship of economic welfare to national security.' °4
The drawbacks to this approach are obvious. It is a very complex
matter to determine even direct military requirements for a given
product under even a relatively simple scenario, such as that used by
the ITA in the past. However, a shift to a definition of "national se-
curity" based upon long-term economic welfare would require an even
more complex determination. In the first place, for this approach to
be feasible at all, the United States government would have to derive a
relatively integrated, quantifiable scheme of what the United States
economy should look like at any given time to maintain its competi-
tiveness. More specifically, the government would have to assess the
importance of a particular product, not just for defense purposes, but
for general economic welfare. This could, in the end, require nothing
less than a full-blown "industrial policy," as the government would
decide what industries are necessary for continued economic health,
and which of these may be allowed to succumb partially or totally to
foreign competition.
The foreign policy ramifications of this approach also would be
104. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (1988).
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negative. As it is, actions under section 232, based even as they are on
narrow, essentially technical criteria, can be expected to draw negative
reactions from the trading partners of the United States. Use of sec-
tion 232 to pursue the still more elusive goal of national security
through economic welfare would inevitably be viewed as protectionist
by the trading partners of the United States, and would probably lead
to challenges before the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
0 5
as well as possible unilateral retaliation.
Given these drawbacks, it is unlikely that "economic welfare" can
play more than an unquantifiable role in the application of section 232.
Yet the foregoing examination of 232 does highlight the increasingly
erroneous assumptions that form the basis of this area of U.S. trade
policy. For this reason, the future operation of section 232 will de-
pend upon reassessment by the United States of what is truly meant by
"national security."
Beyond these broader concerns, section 232 in its present form and
manner of application presents some very real problems. As initially
conceived, section 232 was directed towards the importation of certain
commodities in large volumes. 10 6 In recent years, however, mainte-
nance of the requisite state of military preparedness has become di-
rectly related to technological capability. The current interpretation
and application of section 232, with its emphasis on an essentially
mechanical examination of defense needs in terms of quantities re-
quired of a particular product, appears to be ill-suited to grapple with
the problem of determining how much of a high-technology item is
enough. Current interpretation of the statute is even less able to take
into account the effects upon national security of the very rapid
changes in technology that can occur.
Under such circumstances, continued use of the current approach
could fail to take into account the threat to national security that im-
portation of even small amounts of certain high-technology products
could cause. Such circumstances could arise, for example, where the
costs of the product were high and the market limited, so that even a
105. Some commentators have noted that the language of GATT Article XXI appears to
give the right of interpreting this provision to individual governments. See J. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 748 (1969). This indicates that it would be difficult to chal-
lenge actions under Article XXI before the GATT. Indeed, in a case involving a complaint by
Czechloslovakia against restrictions by the United States on exports to Czecholovakia, it was
stated that "every country must have the last resort on questions relating to its own security."
See id. at 749. Significantly, in the relatively few cases involving this exception that have come
before the GATT, the security measures involved were invoked on explicitly political grounds,
and did not appear to involve direct concerns of military security. See id. at 749-51; see also
JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 8, at 915-16.
106. See supra note 17.
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low level of importation could cause irreparable harm to the domestic
industry. The loss of technological superiority can occur very quickly.
There is nothing in the language of section 232 that would prevent its
successful application in such instances, but past interpretation, if con-
tinued, could lead to a contrary result.
Closely related to the pace of change in technology is that of infant
or future industries. The ITA has applied section 232 by focusing
upon the effect of imports upon existing industries. Yet, given the ra-
pidity of technological .change, imports could prevent the emergence
of an industry producing a product with military applications. One
such example would be high-definition television, a technology with
obvious military potential. In light of the high cost of developing this
technology, imports of high-definition television receivers before such
a product has gone into production in the United States could well
destroy any infant high-density television industry.
The obvious solution to this problem would be the adoption of an
interpretation where the ITA would find a threat to national security
if imports retarded or prevented the development of an industry in the
United States making the product in question. This would be analo-
gous to the "material retardation" standard already found in the in-
jury provisions of the antidumping and countervailing duty law.
0 7
The language of section 232 is broad enough to allow for such a test.
The question is whether, absent legislative direction, the ITA or the
President will in fact implement such a test.
A final question that arises in connection with section 232 is the
effect of the emergence of the multinational corporation upon the law.
International trade, especially in high-technology products, is increas-
ingly dominated by companies operating in more than one country.
As part of rationalization of production, it is common for such firms
to shift production of various products between different locations,
often in different countries. The past cases involving section 232 have
not yet confronted this change, so it is unclear how the ITA would
react when the imports under examination are from the same com-
pany whose operations in the United States constitute part or all of the
domestic industry.
In its present form, section 232 is sufficiently far reaching in its
language to allow interpretations and applications that would address
all of these emerging issues. Yet, as has been shown, the actual inter-
pretation of section 232 has been quite rigid, and would not, as cur-
107. See e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 167ld(b) (1988) (injury determination in countervailing duty law);
19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (1988) (injury determination in antidumping law).
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rently conceived, allow these developments to be taken into account.
The statute in its present form appears to be sufficiently flexible to
allow the ITA and the President to adopt a broader interpretation of
"national security." Failure to do so, and the potential loss of key
industries to foreign competition, could raise the possibility of legisla-
tive intervention in the form of amendments that would describe with
greater specificity the definition of "national security" and the condi-
tions under which threat should be found, and that could limit the
President's discretion by requiring action under such conditions.
II. THE ExON-FLORIo ACT
The Exon-Florio Act 08 is the equivalent of section 232 with re-
gard to foreign investment in the United States. It addresses specifi-
cally the issue of the acquisition of control in United States companies
by foreign persons, where the acquisition could threaten to impair the
national security of the United States. The act authorizes the Presi-
dent to investigate such acquisitions, and to bar them for reasons of
national security. The potential scope of this authority is sweeping:
the operative provision of the Act states simply that, if the President
determines that foreign control of a U.S. company threatens the na-
tional security, he "may take action for such time as the President
considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any acquisition, merger,
or takeover, of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United
States . . .by or with foreign persons so that such control will not
threaten to impair the national security.'
' 10 9
The Exon-Florio Act represents a dramatic change in United
States investment policy. Traditionally, the United States has been
among the most open economies in the world with respect to foreign
investment. Indeed, it is one of the few countries that have not in the
past prohibited foreign ownership of companies in "critical" indus-
tries, i.e., those whose activities are vital for national defense."10 The
Exon-Florio Act could change this by allowing the President to bar
the acquisition of U.S. firms by foreign persons on national security
grounds, to specify the conditions under which the transaction will be
allowed, or even to require the divestment of such firms after acquisi-
tion of control has already occurred."' The President's decision is
absolute, as there is no provision for either judicial review or Congres-
108. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (West Supp. 1989).
109. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(e) (West Supp. 1989).
110. See Brown, Foreword to B. SCHWARTZ, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF U.S. DEFENSE COM-
PANIES (1988).
111. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(c) (West Supp. 1989).
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sional veto. '1 2 Given the authority it affords for broad intervention by
the U.S. government in foreign investment decisions, it is unsurprising
that many of the United States' trade and investment partners have
expressed deep concern over this law.
13
The Exon-Florio Act is of quite recent vintage, becoming law as
part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.114 Even
in the short time since its enactment, however, it has been invoked
several times. Thus, there is sufficient experience with the law to per-
form an initial analysis of how it has been applied, and under what
circumstances, as well as to identify areas in which the law is ambigu-
ous or deficient. Beyond this, however, this article will examine some
of the assumptions and factors that are likely to affect the interpreta-
tion of the Exon-Florio Act in the future. In particular, this article
will focus on the same central issue that was examined above with
respect to section 232: what is the definition of "national security?"
A. Legislative History
The Exon-Florio Act is the product of a combination of economic
and political forces, including the massive influx of foreign investment
into the United States during the 1980s and the transformation of the
United States from a creditor to a debtor nation during the same pe-
riod. "t5 Although the situation giving rise to the law was complex, its
direct impetus was a single event: the highly-publicized threatened
foreign takeover in 1987 of a U.S. semiconductor firm, Fairchild, by
Fujitsu of Japan. Following news of the pending acquisition of
Fairchild, Senator J. James Exon (D-Neb.) met with President Reagan
to protest the proposed acquisition as a threat to national security, and
to urge the President to prohibit it. The President declined to act,
stating that, short of declaring a national emergency, he had no au-
112. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(d) (West Supp. 1989). Congress noted, however, that the
elimination of judicial review applied only to determinations and actions by the President. Thus,
other matters, such as the timeliness of action taken by the Attorney General, would be review-
able. See H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 18, at 925. This ambiguity raises the issue of whether
actions taken by other government officials at the direction of the President pursuant to a deter-
mination under this section could be reviewable, and under what circumstances. Given the pos-
sible variety of such circumstances, this issue can be resolved only in light of actual events.
113. See A. HEATH, BRITISH EMBASSY COMMENTS ON DRAFT REGULATIONS (1989); L.
PHILLIPS, THE BELGIAN AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMMENTS ON DRAFT REGU-
LATIONS (1989); Buy America While Stocks Last, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16-22, 1989, at 63.
114. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 5021, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170
(West Supp. 1989).
115. Foreign takeovers of U.S. firms increased from 4.9% of total takeovers in 1983 to
13.5% in 1988. Total foreign holdings of U.S. assets amounted to about $1.7 trillion or 12% of
all U.S. net wealth at the end of 1988, up from 5% in 1980. The amount of foreign direct
investment (investment in U.S. corporate stock where the foreign investor owns more than 10
percent of the voting securities) currently constitutes about 3% of all fixed capital in the U.S.
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thority to bar the takeover.'16
In response to this event, Senator Exon and Representative James
Florio (D-NJ) simultaneously submitted legislation to authorize the
President to block the acquisition of U.S. companies by foreign per-
sons where he determined that such an acquisition could threaten the
national security of the United States. 1 7 The Administration initially
opposed the bill, on the grounds that the bill ran contrary to the estab-
lished United States policy of encouraging foreign investment, both in
the United States and by the United States in foreign countries.
118
The Administration also argued that existing laws were adequate to
address situations involving the national security. 119 The bill was ulti-
116. See Nathans, Meet Wall Street's New Bugaboo: CFIUS, Bus. WK., June 12, 1989, at 88.
117. S. 907, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 603 (1987). The original draft of what became the
Exon-Florio amendment was an amendment to S. 907, introduced on June 4, 1987 in an execu-
tive session of the Senate Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation. Hearings on the
amendment were conducted on June 10, 1987 and the committee adopted the amendment by
voice vote on June 16, 1987. See S. REP. No. 80, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1987). Later, by
mutual agreement with the Senate Banking Committee, the bill was included within Banking's
portion of S. 1420. See CONG. REC. S10,357-58 (daily ed. July 21, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Hollings) In describing the legislation, Rep. Florio stated that this legislation
would give the President authority to block foreign takeovers of U.S. companies, if the take-
over threatens national security. When Fujitsu, a Japanese semiconductor firm, tried to
takeover Fairchild, a United States-based semiconductor firm, earlier this year, the Presi-
dent found that he had very little authority to act. This provision would give the President
important powers to protect our national security.
134 CONG. REC. H2,320 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Florio). Similarly, Senator
Exon stated that
this legislation was in part the result of my efforts to encourage the administration to protect
the interest in Goodyear/Goldsmith and Fujitsu/Fairchild takeover attempts. These efforts
revealed that our investment policy regarding national security needed to be improved.
With the reduced value of the dollar and the reduced value of stock prices, American firms
are increasingly vulnerable to foreign takeovers.
134 CONG. REC. S4833 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1988) (statement of Senator Exon).
The Goodyear/Goldsmith takeover attempt referred to was a bid by Sir James Goldsmith, a
British financier, to acquire Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company. At the time, there was concern
both that Goldsmith would dismantle Goodyear and that, given the importance of the rubber
industry to national defense, it would be unwise to allow a major producer of rubber and rubber
goods to fall into foreign hands. Goldsmith ultimately abandoned his attempt, allegedly for un-
related reasons. See Krieger, Acquisition of U.S. Businesses by Foreign Buyers: The Impact of
Exon-Florio, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIEs TRANSACTIONS 341, 342 (ABA Nat'l Inst. 1989).
118. See Acquisition by Foreign Companies: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 19 (1987). At these hearings, Secre-
tary of Commerce Baldridge testified against the Exon-Florio bill, stating "[w]e are opposed to
the Exon proposal because we think it will mean a diversion away from the principles that we
have been trying to espouse around the world and the other nations, which is national treatment
for investment, open investment policy, and everything that goes with it."
,119. See Foreign Takeovers and National Security, 1987: Hearings on Section 905 of HR. 3
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness, of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1987) (statement of David
C. Mulford, Assistant Secretary International Affairs, Department of the Treasury). The Ad-
ministration noted in particular that, on a number of previous occasions, CFIUS had reviewed
contemplated takeovers, and the U.S. government had been able to take action to prevent or
regulate the takeover. In 1983, for example, CFIUS had reviewed the takeover by a Japanese
firm of a U.S. specialty steel company. During the review, the Department of Defense classified
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mately incorporated into the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, but only after significant changes, the most important of
which was deletion of a provision for a legislative veto of Presidential
determinations under the act.
120
The key feature of the legislative history of this act is its discussion
of what the act is intended to accomplish, and the circumstances
under which it is intended to operate. The act provides the President
with authority to investigate "mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers"
which could result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States. 12  To initiate an investigation, the
the technology and the Japanese company withdrew its takeover offer. In 1985, a Japanese com-
pany made a takeover bid for a ball bearing manufacturer that specialized in the production of
high-precision ball bearings with a variety of military uses. During the CFIUS review, the De-
partment of Defense raised the concern that a cut-off of U.S. supply could result if production
was shifted abroad. The transaction went forward with the stipulation that the production of
ball bearings supplied to the military take place in the United States. In 1987, a French firm
attempted to merge with a subsidiary of the computer division of a U.S. multinational. The
Department of Defense was concerned because the U.S. subsidiary was engaged in classified
work for the military. The problem was solved by transferring the work to the U.S. parent
company, which was not subject to the takeover.
The Administration also presented testimony describing other U.S. laws that it characterized
as useful in this context. Among the alternative sources of authority for action noted were the
authority of the Justice Department to block takeovers with potential anticompetitive effect and
that of the Department of Defense, under the Defense Industrial Program, to require a corporate
restructuring when the target company in an acquisition has classified government contracts.
The Administration also explained that the export control laws, administered by the Department
of Commerce, regulate exports when there is the possibility that sensitive technology might be
diverted as the result of a foreign takeover. Finally, controls on foreign investment in certain
sectors of the economy, such as atomic energy, aviation, shipping, radio broadcasting and min-
ing, were already in place. Given these alternative approaches, the Administration argued, there
was no need for the explicit authority that would be conferred by the bill. See id. at 17 (state-
ment of J. Michael Farren, Deputy Undersecretary for International Trade, Department of
Commerce).
The Administration's testimony was accurate in describing both past CFIUS practice and
possible alternative approaches to regulating foreign investment on national security grounds.
Yet the conclusion reached, that the bill was not necessary because the President already pos-
sessed adequate authority to act, is directly at odds with the President's own justification for not
intervening in the Fujitsu case, namely, that he did not have the power to do so. Possibly as a
consequence of the presence of alternatives, however, the final version of the bill, and thus the
act, permits the President to act only if he determines that he cannot reach the same result
employing his authority under a different statute. See infra text accompanying note 144.
120. See H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 18, at 924-27.
The bill as originally introduced had provided for a legislative veto, but this provision was
deleted from the versions passed by the two houses of Congress prior to going to conference. See
INSIDE U.S. TRADE 10 (Mar. 25, 1988). In the final version of the bill, a House provision that
designated the Secretary of Commerce as the official responsible for conducting investigations
under the section was also dropped. The final bill also deleted a provision that would have
allowed either the head of any agency (the House version) or certain named officials (the Senate
version) to request an investigation of whether an acquisition threatened the national security.
Consequently, what officials can request an investigation has been fixed by regulation. See infra
text accompanying note 129. More importantly, as will be discussed in detail below, the criteria
considered in determining whether an acquisition threatened to impair the national security. See
H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 18, at 924-25.
121. See H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 18, at 925.
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President must find that there is "credible evidence" which leads him
to believe that the foreign interest exercising control "might take ac-
tion that threatens to impair the national security."' 22 Congress also
noted that it intended the President to invoke this section only if he
found that other provisions of law do not provide him with adequate
authority to act.
123
Having set forth the general parameters of the law, Congress then
attempted to explain what the law was supposed to do. It noted first
that the law was not intended to impose barriers to foreign investment,
and that it was not intended to permit investigations of investments
that could not result in foreign control of a U.S. company or that
would have no effect on national security. Congress stated that the
standard of review in this section is "national security," a term that is
not defined explicitly. Congress stated further, however, that "[t]he
term 'national security' is intended to be interpreted broadly, without
limitation to specific industries."1 24 Congress concluded by noting
that the statute provided powers to the President in addition to those
already existing, but was not intended to abrogate existing U.S. treaty
commitments.,
25
The evolution of the bill's coverage is especially significant. The
House bill would have allowed the Secretary of Commerce to deter-
mine the effects of proposed or pending transactions on "national se-
curity, essential commerce, and economic welfare," 1 26 and would have
required the President to act if the Secretary determined that foreign
control would threaten to impair the national security and essential
commerce, unless the President determined that there was no such
threat. The House bill specified as covered transactions mergers, ac-
quisitions, joint ventures, licensing, and takeovers by or with foreign
companies.' 27 The Senate bill was similar, except that the criteria for
assessing the effects of a transaction would be "national security, or
essential commerce which relates to national security," and the Presi-
dent was allowed rather than required to act if a threat were found.
Application of the act would be limited to mergers, acquisitions, and
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 926. Congress explained that the term "national security" was not intended to
imply any limitation on the term "national defense," as used in the Defense Production Act, and
noted that "national defense" had been correctly interpreted in the past to include the provision
of a broad range of goods and services, including technological innovations and economic stabili-
zation efforts. Id. at 926-27.
125. See id. at 927.
126. Id. at 924.
127. Id.
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takeovers, but not joint ventures or licensing arrangements.' 28
In conference, Congress altered the coverage of the bill so that the
test for action depended upon whether a transaction threatened to im-
pair the national security.' 29 This is, on its face, a narrower test than
that proposed by either the House or Senate versions, even though the
Conference Committee stated that it intended that "national security"
be interpreted broadly. ' 30 The final version of the bill also adopted the
Senate approach to Presidential action, making it discretionary rather
than mandatory. In summary, the final bill restricts its coverage to
mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers.' 3' Thus, having decided to act,
Congress finally agreed to a bill that is relatively narrow in scope, and
that clearly leaves the President with essentially unfettered discretion
to act or not, as he sees fit.
B. Operation of the Exon-Florio Act
Action under the Exon-Florio Act occurs in two stages. First, the
President, or his designee, investigates the effects of a proposed or
pending merger, takeover, or acquisition on the national security.
132
Based on the results of this investigation, the President then decides
what, if any, action to take. 13
3
The statute provides that "The President or the President's desig-
nee may make an investigation to determine the effects on national
security of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers proposed or pending
... by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign control of
persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States."' 134 The
President has designated the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States ("CFIUS") as his designee for these
purposes. 135 The statute states that if it is decided that an investiga-
128. Id. at 925.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 926.
131. Id. at 925.
,132. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a) (West Supp. 1989).
133. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(c) (West Supp. 1989).
134. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a) (West Supp. 1989).
135.. Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 54
Fed. Reg. 29,744 (Dept. Commerce 1989) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800) [hereinafter Pro-
posed Regulations]. The Treasury Department has stated that it intends to issue final regulations
by the Summer of 1990.
CFIUS is a cabinet-level interagency group chaired by a Treasury representative. CFIUS
predated the Exon-Florio amendment as it was created in 1975 out of concern over Arab invest-
ment in U.S. companies. Before Exon-Florio, however, its mandate was to monitor the impact of
foreign investment in the United States. The agencies represented on CFIUS include Treasury,
Commerce, State, Defense, and Justice as well as the Office of Management and Budget, the
Council of Economic Advisors, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. The various
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tion shall be undertaken, it must commence within thirty days of the
receipt by the President of written notification of the proposed transac-
tion, as prescribed by regulation.
136
The receipt of notice of a transaction triggers the Exon-Florio in-
vestigatory process. The statute contemplates that the President will
be notified of mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers with national security
implications as a matter of course, and that the form and content of
such notification, as well as the circumstances under which notifica-
tion must be provided, will be established by regulations. 137 In its pro-
posed regulations,1 38 CFIUS establishes a "voluntary" system of
notice in which any party to a subject transaction may choose to give
notice of the transaction.1 39 CFIUS's proposed regulations describe in
detail the contents of a voluntary notice, which consists essentially of a
detailed description of the contemplated transaction.' 4° In addition,
agencies have differing institutional interests: Treasury favors free flow of investment capital;
Defense may have a fear of foreign parties and a belief that they pose national security risks;
Commerce may consider both the protection of U.S. business from foreign encroachment on the
one hand and the danger of cutting off foreign capital on the other. For this reason, the designa-
tion of the Treasury Department rather than the Department of Commerce as the agency with
primary power over implementation of Exon-Florio was widely viewed as an indication that the
act would not be vigorously applied.
136. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a) (West Supp. 1989). The legislative history states that this
30-day limit is jurisdictional, so that if the President does not act within 30 days, he cannot
commence an investigation. See H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 18, at 925. Because the exemp-
tion from judicial review applies only to findings by the President, id., any attempt by the Presi-
dent to commence an investigation after the 30-day period would presumably be subject to
judicial challenge.
137. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a) (West Supp. 1989); H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 18, at
925. However, the President's power to investigate transactions vested immediately. The legisla-
tive history explicitly explains that the President's power to investigate is not contingent upon the
promulgation of implementing regulations. Id. at 925.
138. Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,744.
139. Id. at 29,753, § 800.401(a). Notice can be filed by a party to an acquisition even if the
proposed acquisition is "hostile." See id. at 29,748. This opens up the possibility of Exon-Florio
being used as a tool in takeover battles, a possibility discussed further below.
140. See id. at 29,753, § 800.402(b). Among the data required to be included in the notice
are: (1) a complete description of the transaction, including its nature (merger, takeover, etc.);
the name, address, etc. of the foreign person making the acquisition; the name and address of the
U.S. person being acquired; the name, address, and nationality of the parent of the foreign person
making the acquisition; the name, address, and nationality of the persons or interests which will
exercise control over the U.S. person being acquired, and an explanation of the manner in which
such control will be exercised; and the expected date for concluding the transaction; (2) a de-
scription of the assets of the U.S. person being acquired, if the acquisition is structured as an
acquisition of assets or a business; (3) specific information regarding the U.S. person being ac-
quired and any of its subsidiaries, including their business activities; identification of products or
services that they provide to the U.S. Department of Defense or which have technology with
military applications; the location of facilities producing such products or providing such serv-
ices; and identification of each contract with an agency of the U.S. Government involving any
classified information, technology, or data; (4) the business of the foreign person making the
acquisition; and (5) the plans of the foreign person for the U.S. person with respect to defense-
related goods or services or goods or services that affect the national security, including reduc-
tion, elimination, or sale of research and development or facilities; changes in product quality;
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any CFIUS member may submit an "agency notice" if it has reason to
believe that a proposed acquisition is subject to the Exon-Florio Act
and may have adverse effects upon national security.' 4t Although no-
tification by a party to a transaction is voluntary, a consequence of not
giving notice is that even a concluded transaction remains subject to
Presidential action, should the President subsequently investigate it
and determine that it threatens to impair the national security. 142 It is
therefore in the interests of the parties to a transaction to provide no-
tice at as early a stage in the transaction as possible, so that this matter
is resolved before substantial time and resources are committed to an
acquisition that may have to be altered significantly, or may even be
barred, by Presidential direction.
As was noted above, upon receipt of notification of a transaction,
the President, through CFIUS, must decide within thirty days
whether to initiate an investigation. 143 In reviewing a notice, CFIUS
will consider (1) whether the acquisition is by or for a foreign person,
and could result in foreign control of a U.S. person; (2) whether there
is "credible evidence to support a belief that a foreign interest exercis-
shutting down, moving offshore, or relocating facilities within the United States; or consolidating
or selling product lines or technology. Id.
In addition, the notice must state whether the U.S. person being acquired exports products or
technical data for which validated licenses are required or articles and services under the Interna-
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations (the Munitions List). Id., § 800.402(c). The notice must also
list any reports or findings by other government agencies regarding the proposed acquisition. Id.
at 29,754, § 800.402(d). Finally, the notice must have as appendices the annual reports of all the
parties concerned. Id., § 800.402(f). In the case of joint ventures, the information in the notice
must be prepared on the assumption that the joint venture is in fact an acquisition of the U.S.
partner. Id. § 800.402(e). CFIUS retains the right to reject voluntary notices if they do not
comply with the requirements, or if CFIUS was not notified of a material change in the transac-
tion. Id. § 800.402(h).
141. Id. at 29,753, § 800,401(b). The agencies thus eligible to submit notices are listed in
note 124, supra. If CFIUS receives an agency notice, it must send a copy of the notice to the
parties to the transaction within two business days after its receipt. Id. at 29,754, § 800.403(b).
142. See Id. at 29,748. In its comments on the proposed regulations, CFIUS stated:
Although the regulations create a voluntary notice scheme, it is important to note that if a
transaction comes under section 721 [of the Defense Production Act of 1950] and neither
party, nor a Committee agency, submits notice to the Committee, it remains indefinitely
subject to divestment should the President subsequently make the required findings as de-
scribed in § 800.601(b).
Id. The indefinite authority to impose divestiture may not be in accord with legislative intent.
The conference report on the final bill states that Congress expects that, through regulation, the
President will "provide parties to the transactions with a clearly delineated beginning and ending
point to the time during which a transaction would be subject to review." H.R. REP. No. 576,
supra note 18, at 925. On the other hand, indefinite authority to review a transaction may be a
necessary means of ensuring that the President and CFIUS are in fact notified of all transactions
which are properly reportable.
143. Nonetheless, it is CFIUS that decides when the notice was actually filed. It can do so by
rejecting a notice, or by otherwise suggesting that the filing party amend or supplement the
notice. In this manner, CFIUS can both effectively provide the parties with a period to restruc-
ture the transaction in a manner that is more likely to gain the approval of CFIUS.
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ing control of the U.S. person to be acquired might take action that
threatens to impair the national security"; and (3) whether other pro-
visions of the law provide adequate authority to protect the national
security.' 44 Essentially, CFIUS's initial review determines whether
the transaction raises national security concerns. If it does not,
CFIUS will not undertake an investigation. If, on the other hand,
CFIUS concludes that the transaction could threaten to impair the
national security, and that no other law would adequately protect the
interests of the United States, it will initiate an investigation. 145 The
investigation must commence within the thirty-day period following
the receipt of notification of a transaction. 146 CFIUS must inform the
parties to the acquisition of the investigation's commencement,
1 47
although there is no specified time limit for doing so.
Having initiated an investigation, CFIUS has 45 days to complete
it. 148 At the end of the investigation, CFIUS reports to the President
with a recommendation. 149 The focus of the investigation is the effect
of proposed or pending mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers by or for
foreign persons which could result in foreign control of a U.S. person
engaged in interstate commerce. 150 In its investigation, therefore,
CFIUS must answer four questions: (1) is a foreign person involved in
the transaction; (2) is the target U.S. person engaged in interstate com-
merce; (3) will the transaction result in foreign control of the U.S.
person; and (4) what will be the effects of the transaction on the na-
tional security of the United States? The first two questions are rela-
tively straightforward, although what constitutes a "foreign person"
may be subject to interpretation. The determination of whether the
transaction will result in foreign control of a U.S. person is more diffi-
cult. The proposed regulations define "control," but there remains a
good deal of discretion in interpretation. The final issue, the effects of
the transaction on national security, is obviously the most complex,
144. Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,754, § 800.501. The phrase "credible evi-
dence" mirrors the statement in the legislative history that "The President must find that there is
credible evidence which leads [him] to believe that a foreign interest exercising control of a per-
son engaged in interstate commerce in 'the United States might take action that threatens to
impair the national security." H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 18, at 925.
145. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,749.
146. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a) (West Supp. 1989). Proposed Regulations, supra note
135, at 29,754, § 800.503.
147. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,754, § 800.503(b).
148. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a) (West Supp. 1989).
149. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,754, § 800.504(b). The report and rec-
ommendation must be unanimous; otherwise, the report shall set forth the different views of the
committee members and present the issues involved to the President for resolution.
150. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a) (West Supp. 1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 576, supra
note 18, at 926.
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and represents the area in which CFIUS has the most discretion in
making its recommendations to the President.
CFIUS procedures include submission of a questionnaire to the
parties involved, follow-up questions, and an informal hearing. 15 1
This process may begin during the initial thirty-day consideration pe-
riod, so that CFIUS may request very specific information on a trans-
action before it decides whether or not to investigate. Cooperation of
the parties to a notified transaction in providing information is
mandatory,1 52 although it is unclear what, if any, penalties would ap-
ply for non-cooperation, other than the possibility of a recommenda-
tion that the President prohibit the transaction. Generally, all
information submitted in an investigation is treated as confidential,
and is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information
151. See Krieger, supra note 117, at 370-72; Foreign Buyers Beware: CFIUS Review
Nightmare, 6 CORPORATE CONTROL ALERT I (Mar. 1989) [hereinafter CFIUS Review
Nightmare]. "Acquisition of U.S. Businesses" provides an excellent overview of the genesis of
Exon-Florio, as well as descriptions of early cases under the statute.
The draft questionnaire published by CFIUS requests information on four main topics: (1)
acquisition arrangements; (2) effect on the U.S. market; (3) effect on U.S. security; and (4) new
owner's plans. Under (1), the parties are asked to describe the acquisition and to identify the
parties involved, including their nationalities. CFIUS gauges the potential effect of the acquisi-
tion on the U.S. market by requesting information regarding the market share of the target firm
and alternative sources of domestic supply. The longest part of the questionnaire involves infor-
mation requested regarding the potential effects of the acquisition on national security. CFIUS
asks, inter alia, whether the purchaser will acquire classified or sensitive technology or control
over a scarce supply of goods "which bear on" national security; the percentage of defense-
related production by the target firm; whether the target firm, including its subsidiaries, is en-
gaged in classified work for the Department of Defense; whether it is a sole-source supplier to the
Department of Defense; whether it holds validated export licenses or exports products on the
Munitions List; and whether it has undertaken any research and development for the Depart-
ment of Defense.
The final section of the questionnaire requests information regarding the new owner's plans
regarding production lines, levels of production, product quality, and facility locations. The
questionnaire asks specifically whether the new owner will continue to make in the United States
.all defense-related goods currently being made by the target firm, and whether there are any
plans regarding consolidation, expansion, or relocation of defense-related product lines. The
questionnaire also asks whether the new owner will continue to supply the Department of De-
fense or its contractors with the same products currently being supplied, and what the effect of
the acquisition will be on suppliers and customers of the target firm. Finally, the questionnaire
asks what the new owner's plans are regarding research and development. See Krieger, supra,
note 117, at 370-71.
In addition to these standard questions, CFIUS may also request transaction-specific data,
such as the identity of major customers of the target firm, sales volume, and manufacturing
techniques. See CFIUS Review Nightmare, supra, at 2. CFIUS may ask follow-up questions as
well; in one past investigation, these questions focused on whether the foreign acquiror intended
to transfer technology from the target firm to foreigners, as well as more general information
regarding the corporate structure of the acquiror. See id. at 3.
CFIUS's proposed regulations do not provide for hearings. In at least one past investigation,
however, two hearings were held, both in the initial thirty-day period prior to CFIUS's decision
to investigate. Attendance at the hearings, and the ability to ask questions, is apparently not
restricted to the member agencies of CFIUS, as CFIUS has allowed the participation of any
Executive Branch agency interested in the case. See id.
152. Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,755, § 800.701(a).
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Act. 1
53
The most notable feature of the Exon-Florio procedure, as set
forth in the proposed regulations, is its total lack of transparency.
Once an investigation is commenced, it basically disappears into a
"black box." There is no regulatory requirement that CFIUS accept
comments by any parties, or that CFIUS hold hearings. There is no
provision that CFIUS notify potentially interested parties, such as
other U.S. companies in the same industry, or allow them to partici-
pate in the proceedings. Once an investigation has commenced,
CFIUS is not required to keep the parties abreast of what the commit-
tee is doing. "This lack of transparency, and the restriction on the
opportunities of other parties to participate in an investigation, could
hamper the efforts of CFIUS itself to obtain and anlyze all the relevant
information, and could limit the utility of CFIUS decisions as guide-
lines for future conduct."
Finally, and most importantly, there is no requirement that CFIUS
explain the basis for its final decision or that it publish its decisions.
This gap in the law is especially confusing because CFIUS's decisions,
as explained by the committee, would provide the best guide for par-
ties in future transactions. Instead, the public (including Congress) is
forced to rely upon press accounts of CFIUS decisions, an unsatisfac-
tory alternative.
Having received the recommendation from CFIUS, the President
must decide within fifteen days whether to take action regarding the
transaction. 1 54 The President may act only if he finds that (1) "there is
credible evidence that leads the President to believe that the foreign
interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair
the national security," and (2) that other provisions of the law do not
provide him with adequate authority to address the problem.' As
was noted above, these findings are not subject to judicial review. 1
56 If
the President does decide to act, he must "immediately" transmit a
report to the Senate and the House that includes a detailed explana-
tion of his findings.17
The statute affords the President near-unfettered discretion in act-
ing, stating that "the President may take such action for such time as
the President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any acquisi-
tion, merger, or takeover, of a person engaged in interstate commerce
153. Id. at 29,755, § 800.702(a).
154. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(c) (West Supp. 1989).
155. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(d) (West Supp. 1989).
156. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 576, at 925.
157. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(f) (West Supp. 1989).
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in the United States... by or with foreign persons so that such control
will not threaten to impair the national security."158 Among the ac-
tions the President may take are directing the Attorney General to
seek the appropriate relief, including divestiture, in the federal district
courts. 159 The legislative history stresses that the term "appropriate
relief" is intended to be interpreted broadly, and that this provision
gives the President the flexibility to deal with the wide range of facts
and circumstances that may be present in covered transactions. 160
The statute gives the President the power to suspend or prohibit trans-
actions. However, as a practical matter, it is clear that the President
also has the power to allow a transaction to proceed only if certain
conditions are met.1 61 There is no provision for judicial review of the
President's decision to act, although the legislative history indicates
that some aspects of the action, such as the timeliness of action taken
by the Attorney General, may be subject to judicial challenge. 6
2
Three features of the operation of Exon-Florio deserve special em-
phasis. The first is the extremely tight schedule built into the statute.
The maximum period from receipt of notification of a transaction to
the announcement of Presidential action is ninety days. This is a very
short period within which CFIUS and the President must analyze a
proposed transaction, identify its national security implications, and
determine whether action is necessary. Given the potentially substan-
tial impact the investigation and decision can have upon both the
economy and security of the United States, as well as its relations with
other countries, and the complexity of the transactions that may be
subject to investigation, the obvious question is whether a sufficiently
thorough investigation can be performed and a truly informed decision
made within this short amount of time. 163
However, as mentioned above, any party to a transaction may re-
quest an investigation, even if the proposed acquisition is hostile.
Exon-Florio could thus serve as a defense by existing management in a
hostile takeover situation. The short time limits for investigation and
action would serve to limit the utility of this defense by ensuring that
158. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(c) (West Supp. 1989).
159. Id.; see also Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,755, § 800.601(c).
160. See H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 18, at 927. The legislative history notes that the
President possesses broad injunctive and equitable powers under this act, including the power to
seek divestment of control. The President should seek divestment relief, however, only if the
transaction is completed after notification of the transaction is received and before the end of the
15-day period for Presidential action.
161. See text accompaning note 213, infra.
162. See H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 18, at 925.
163. In fact, as noted above, CFIUS can effectively extend this period by manipulating the
date on which it considered the notice as having been filed. See supra note 143.
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the issue would be resolved within ninety days, and there are in any
case a number of other, more directly effective methods of corporate
defense. Nonetheless, this relatively short period of delay may be suffi-
cient to sabotage a proposed acquisition, especially if existing manage-
ment can use the time either to strip the corporation of assets, thereby
making it an unattractive target, or to seek another buyer, i.e., a
"white knight." Even the short time limits embodied in the CFIUS
procedures could allow the target corporation to take some defensive
measures, but any further shortening of time limits for investigation
and action is probably unrealistic, and could lead to still hastier
results.
A second noteworthy aspect of Exon-Florio is that, if the time lim-
its within which the President must act after receiving notice of a
transaction are short, the period within which a transaction can be
reviewed is not. The Presidential duty to act does not arise until the
President is notified of a transaction. Thus, the fact that a transaction
has been completed is no guarantee that Exon-Florio does not apply;
there is no "statute of limitations" for application of the statute. On
the contrary, CFIUS can initiate an investigation and the President
can act any time after notice is received. Accordingly, parties who are
concerned that national security problems may arise in connection
with a transaction cannot hope to avoid these problems by completing
the transaction without notification.
The final, obvious feature of the operation of Exon-Florio is the
extent to which the President and CFIUS enjoy discretion. There is
no judicial review of CFIUS's decision whether to investigate a trans-
action, its recommendation to the President, or the President's final
decision whether and how to act. As was discussed above, Congress
enacted the law to provide the President with authority he did not
formerly have, but has left the utilization of that authority almost en-
tirely to the President's discretion. This implies not only that Con-
gress recognized that the application of Exon-Florio would be highly
political, but also that it intended that state of affairs. Nonetheless,
this does not necessarily imply that Congress intended the President to
apply the statute in a manner less aggressive than contemplated by it.
C. Coverage of Exon-Florio
If the operation of Exon-Florio is relatively straightforward, its
coverage is not. Neither the statute nor the proposed regulations de-
fine precisely what transactions are potentially covered. Given the
President's power to investigate an acquisition and even to order di-
vestment, it is important for would-be acquirors to know whether the
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transaction could be subject to Exon-Florio. The existing ambiguity is
perhaps unavoidable, given the novelty and lack of administrative ex-
perience with the law, but it nonetheless presents a source of confusion
and concern. Beyond this, the statute and the regulations are also de-
liberately vague regarding the very focus of the statute: what consti-
tutes the national security?
On its face, Exon-Florio could affect mergers, acquisitions, or take-
overs, in which a foreign person obtains control of a United States
person engaged in interstate commerce. There are thus, from the
start, four key terms requiring definition and elucidation: the types of
covered transactions, "foreign person," "U.S. person," and "control."
The proposed regulations seek to define all of these terms, with vary-
ing degrees of precision and confusion.
A general statement of the coverage of Exon-Florio is found in the
proposed regulations under a section entitled "Scope," which de-
scribes the purpose of the act as authorizing the President to suspend
any acquisition of control by a foreign person of a U.S. person where
such control threatens to impair the national security.164 The act ap-
plies to transactions concluded on or after the effective date of the
act, 165 August 23, 1988.166 This includes both transactions that were
proposed and those that were actually pending as of the effective
date. 167 The regulations further define covered transactions schemati-
cally as acquisitions "by or with foreign persons" "which could result
in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the
United States."
168
The statute states that the President has authority to investigate
and suspend or prohibit "mergers, acquisitions and takeovers."'
1 69
The regulations do not define "merger," "acquisition," or "takeover."
Rather, they use the term "acquisition" as including all three types of
transactions. 170 "Acquisition" is defined essentially in terms of owner-
ship of securities or assets. Thus, an acquisition includes the purchase
164. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,750, § 800.101.
165. Id. at 29,570, § 800.103.
166. See id. at 29,750, § 800.202.
167. See id. at 29,572, § 800.301(a)(1); see also 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a) (West Supp.
1989).
168. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,572, § 800.301(a).
169. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a) (West Supp. 1989).
170. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,746. However, in its comments on the
proposed regulations, CFIUS does partially define "takeover" by providing that a proxy solicita-
tion constitutes a takeover, and thus falls within the scope of the statute, if it could result in the
control of a U.S. person by a foreign person. Accordingly, it would appear that proxy solicita-
tions on subjects other than corporate control would not constitute reviewable transactions under
the regulations.
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of the voting securities of a U.S. person, the conversion of convertible
voting securities, or the acquisition of convertible voting securities if
such acquisition results in a transfer of control. 171 Reviewable acquisi-
tions also include the acquisition of a business, including the acquisi-
tion of production or research and development facilities if certain
conditions are met.' 72 Finally, a consolidation is a reviewable
acquisition. '
73
Although they do not define "acquisition" further, CFIUS's pro-
posed regulations do provide examples. These include: (1) proposed
or completed acquisitions by or with foreign persons that have or
could have resulted in foreign control of a U.S. person; 7 4 (2) a pro-
posed acquisition by a foreign person of a U.S. person that could result
in foreign control, including an offer to purchase all or a substantial
portion of the securities of a U.S. person; 7 5 (3) proposed or completed
acquisitions by entities organized in the United States if those entities
are "foreign persons" and if the acquisition could or did result in a
new foreign interest controlling the U.S. person to be acquired;176 (4)
acquisition of businesses that could result in the foreign control of
businesses located in the United States; 7 7 and (5) joint ventures be-
171. See id. at 29,750, § 800.201(a). The regulation defines "voting securities" as securities
that entitle the owner or holder to vote for the election of directors or, for unincorporated enti-
ties, officers exercising similar functions. Id. at 29,751, § 800.217. A "convertible voting secur-
ity" is a voting security that does not currently entitle its owner or holder to vote for directors.
Id. § 800.218. "Conversion" refers to the exchange of non-voting for voting securities. Id.
§ 800.219.
172. See id. at 29,750, § 800.201(b). This provision allows the treatment of a purchase of
assets as a reviewable acquisition. It does not, however, include the purchase of assets if the
purchase does not result in the acquisition of control of "an ongoing, sustainable business."
Thus, the ordinary sale of equipment would not be reviewable. See id. at 29,746. For an acquisi-
tion of assets to constitute an "acquisition" within the meaning of the regulations, it must be
likely that the foreign acquiror will use the technology of the acquired U.S. person, or personnel
previously employed by it. See id. 29,750, § 800.201(b).
173. Id. § 800.201(c).
174. See id. 29,752, § 800.301(b)(1). Such an acquisition would be reviewable regardless of
the actual arrangements for control. Thus, in such an acquisition foreign control could be as-
sumed even if the existing directors retain their positions and even if all of the directors are U.S.
nationals. The focus is rather on whether the foreign person has the legal right to appoint direc-
tors and other primary officers. See id. examples I and 2; see also id. at 29,747.
175. See id. at 29,752, § 800.301(b)(2). This provision thus treats tender offers as "proposed
transactions" that are reviewable under the statute. Id. at 29,747-48.
176. See id. at 29,752, § 800.301(b)(3). This provision accordingly includes within the cover-
age of the statute acquisitions by U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations, and serves as an addi-
tional means of preventing circumvention of the statute by using a company organized in the
United States but controlled by a foreign person as the acquiror. Significantly, the provision
describes the acquisition of control by a "new" foreign interest. This implies that the acquisition
of the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign company by another foreign company or person could none-
theless be covered by the statute. This point is explored further in the discussion of "U.S. per-
son," infra text accompanying note 180.
177. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,752, § 800.301(b)(4). The regulation
gives as an example the purchase of a branch office business in the United States. Such an acqui-
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tween a foreign person and a U.S. person, where the circumstances are
such that a foreign business could gain control over the business of a
U.S. person. 78 The proposed regulations also enumerate a number of
types of transactions that are not "acquisitions" within the meaning of
the act, thus creating "safe harbors" from the operation of the act.179
The next key terms in defining the coverage of Exon-Florio are
"United States person" and "foreign person," as the statute applies
only to the acquisition of control of a U.S. person by a foreign person.
A "U.S. person" is defined as "any entity but only to the extent of its
business activities in interstate commerce in the United States, irre-
spective of the nationality of the individuals which control it.''tSo
The definition of "foreign person" is more complex. The regula-
tions define foreign person as "any foreign national" or "any entity
sition is covered even if the company owning the branch office is also a foreign person; the key
factor is that the business is physically located in the United States. See id. example 1. On the
other hand, a start-up investment does not fall within this provision, even if the investment in-
volves acquisition of shares of a subsidiary newly incorporated in the United States. The focus is
thus whether the foreign person is acquiring control of an ongoing business in the United States.
See supra note 158.
178. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,752, § 800.301(b)(5). In its comments
on the proposed regulations, CFIUS notes that neither the statute nor the legislative history
address the status of joint ventures. Indeed, the final version of the bill omitted the explicit
reference to joint ventures that appeared in the House version of the bill. Under the proposed
regulations, a joint venture could be treated as the acquisition of control if the arrangements and
circumstances of the joint venture would allow the exercise of control by a foreign person over a
business in the United States. See id.
179. See id. at 29,752, § 800.302. Transactions exempt from Exon-Florio include (1) an ac-
quisition of voting securities pursuant to a stock split or pro rata stock dividend; (2) acquisition
of one subsidiary of a foreign person by another subsidiary of the same person; (3) an acquisition
of convertible voting securities that does not involve control; (4) the purchase of voting securities
solely for purposes of investment, if the foreign person would hold ten percent or less of the
outstanding voting securities of the U.S. person or if the foreign acquiror is a bank, trust com-
pany, insurance company, investment company, pension fund, mutual fund, finance company, or
brokerage company in the ordinary course of business for its own account, provided that a signif-
icant portion of the business of such company does not consist of the acquisition of entities; (5)
the acquisition of assets that do not constitute a business in the United States; (6) the acquisition
of securities by a securities underwriter in the ordinary course of business and in the process of
underwriting; and (7) an acquisition pursuant to a condition in an insurance contract.
With respect to an acquisition "solely for purposes of investment," that term is defined as the
acquisition of securities with no intention of participating in the business decisions of the issuer.
See id. at 29,751 § 800.220(a). Significantly, acquisitions by insurance companies, brokerage
companies, etc. are exempt only if a significant portion of the business of the acquiring company
does not consist of the acquisition of entities. See id. at 29,752-29,753, § 800.302(d)(2). Thus,
acquisitions by merger and acquisition firms or investment bankers who frequently purchase
entire companies would fall within the scope of Exon-Florio. The treatment of a purchase of
assets as an acquisition, and the circumstances under which such a purchase will not be treated
as an acquisition, are discussed in note 172, supra.
180. Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,751, § 800.2 10. Examples of U.S. persons
include the branch office or U.S. subsidiary of a foreign company. Accordingly, even a company
in the United States wholly-owned by a foreign company could be considered a U.S. person.
However, the mere sale of goods or services in the United States by a foreign company, where the
company has no branch office, subsidiary, or fixed place of business, does not render that com-
pany a "United States person." See id. at 29,747.
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over which control is or could be exercised by a foreign interest."1 8' A
foreign national is, logically, "any individual other than a United
States national," 182 while a foreign interest is defined as any individual
other than a U.S. national. t83 Two features of the extended definition
of "foreign person" merit comment. The first is that the United States
subsidiary of a foreign company would qualify as a "foreign person" if
it engages in a covered acquisition. Thus, a U.S. subsidiary of a for-
eign company will be treated as a U.S. person if it is the target of an
acquisition, but as a foreign person if it is the acquiring party. The
second feature of the definition is that the identification of "foreign
person" depends upon the concept of "control."
"Foreign control" is the essential fact triggering operation of the
statute with respect to a transaction. The concept of foreign control is
relevant in two ways: the President may investigate a transaction that
could result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate com-
merce in the United States, and he may suspend, prohibit, or take
other action regarding a transaction if foreign control of a U.S. person
threatens to impair the national security.' 8 4 In addition, as discussed
above, a person may be a foreign person if it is controlled by a foreign
interest.
Control is defined by the proposed regulations very broadly; it is
essentially "the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, ...
to formulate, determine, direct or decide matters affecting the [ac-
quired] entity .... ,,t85 The regulations describe the manner in which
control may be exercised as including the ownership of a majority or
dominant minority of the voting securities of an issuer, by proxy vot-
ing, by contractual arrangements, or by other means. The exercise of
control is not restricted to these methods, however.' 8 6 The focus is
rather on whether a foreign person can, as a practical matter, exert
control over a U.S. person, by whatever means. However, the "re-
181. Id. at 29,751, § 800.211.
182. Id. at 29,751, § 800.209. A "United States national" is a United States citizen or a non-
citizen who "owes permanent allegiance to the United States." Id. at 29,750, § 800.208.
183. Id. at 29,751, § 800.212. The regulations explicitly provide that a foreign government
can be a "foreign interest."
184. See id. at 29,747.
185. Id. at 29,751, § 800.213. In particular, control exists where the person in question has
the power to affect or effect decisions regarding (1) the sale, lease, or other disposition of assets of
the entity, whether or not in the ordinary course of business; (2) the dissolution of the entity; (3)
the closing or relocation of production or research and development facilities of the entity; (4)
termination or non-fulfillment of contracts by the entity; or (5) amendments to the Articles of
Incorporation or constituent agreement of the entity regarding the matters enumerated in (1) -
(4). See id.
186. See id.
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mote, eventual possibility of control," as might exist where a foreign
investor holds shares in a U.S. company solely for investment, does
not constitute "control" under the regulations.1 87 As with so many
other aspects of Exon-Florio and CFIUS's proposed regulations, the
definition of "control" is sufficiently ambiguous and flexible, and al-
lows CFIUS and the President great discretion both in deciding
whether to investigate a transaction and in determining whether the
completed transaction is likely to result in foreign control of a U.S.
person.
The final, and most difficult, concept in identifying the scope and
coverage of Exon-Florio is that of "national security." As with con-
trol, this concept is central to the ability of CFIUS to investigate a
proposed transaction and to the ability of the President to act. Specifi-
cally, CFIUS may investigate a transaction only if it will have an effect
upon the national security, and the President may suspend or prohibit
it only if the foreign person gaining control as a consequence of the
transaction is likely to exercise that control in a manner that threatens
to impair the national security. "National security" thus occupies the
same position in the Exon-Florio statutory scheme that it holds under
section 232. Moreover, as with section 232, this central concept is left
essentially undefined.
The absence of a definition for "national security" under Exon-
Florio is deliberate. The legislative history notes that the term "na-
tional security" is not otherwise defined. 188 Similarly, the comments
on the proposed regulations state flatly that "the proposed regulations
do not attempt to define 'national security.' ",189 Nevertheless, it is
possible to formulate, if not a definition of "national security" for pur-
poses of application of the statute, at least a description of it.
Although Congress did not define "national security," it did stress
187. See id. This exception would appear to cover one potentially troublesome area for ap-
plication of Exon-Florio, international loan agreements. Concerns have been expressed that the
possible reach of Exon-Florio could interfere with even routine international financing, e.g., if a
U.S. borrower defaults on a loan given by a foreign lender, control could switch to the creditor.
See Nathans, supra note 116, at 91. Similarly, it is quite common for international loan agree-
ments (like many agreements with domestic banks) to restrict the ability of the U.S. borrower to
pledge, mortgage, or otherwise use the principal assets of the borrower as security for additional
debt, without the approval of the lender. When financing agreements give lenders rights in the
event of default, the transaction could arguably be covered by the statute, as these contractual
arrangements could result in the ability of the lender to influence the decisions enumerated as
examples of control. In most cases, however, the actual exercise of this control would presuma-
bly be considered remote, so that the statute would not apply. Beyond this, loans would not
appear to fall within the statutory language of the statute as "mergers, acquisitions, or take-
overs," and would not constitute "acquisitions" within the meaning of the proposed regulations.
188. See H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 18, at 926.
189. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,746.
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that it intended that the term be interpreted broadly. 90 Beyond this,
the statute provides the President with a number of factors he and
CFIUS may consider in their determinations. These factors thus pro-
vide guidance to the President and CFIUS in determining whether a
transaction will affect the national security negatively, but do not limit
their ability to consider other factors as well. 191 The factors include
(1) domestic production needed to satisfy projected national defense
requirements; (2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to
meet national defense requirements, including the availability of
human resources, products, technology, materials, and other supplies
and services; and (3) the control of domestic industries and commer-
cial activities as it affects the ability of the United States to meet the
requirements of national security.
19 2
A review of these factors indicates that Congress intended that the
term "national security" be interpreted in the context of national de-
fense. Two of the three factors listed in the statute deal explicitly with
national defense matters, while the third uses the more ambiguous
term "national security." In context, it appears that the third factor
should also be interpreted in terms of national defense. Similarly,
although CFIUS's proposed regulations do not otherwise discuss what
is meant by national security, they do note that national security con-
cerns would be present in an acquisition involving products or key
technologies essential to the U.S. defense industrial base. 193 A defense
orientation for "national security" under Exon-Florio would be con-
sistent with the approach in section 232 which, as discussed above, has
been to concentrate almost solely on military needs for the particular
product.
Even given the apparent focus of Exon-Florio on military needs, it
is not always simple to determine even whether a particular product or
service that would be involved in an acquisition has military uses, or
whether the acquisition could otherwise affect the national security.
This is especially true if "national security" is given an expansive defi-
nition so as to include economic welfare. The proposed regulations
give some guidance in this respect, providing that, for example, a party
giving notice must include in the notice such information as whether it
provides products or services to the Department of Defense, whether
it has technology that could have military applications, whether it has
contracts with the U.S. Government involving classified technology or
190. See H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 18, at 926.
191. See id.
192. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(e) (West Supp. 1989).
193. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 135, at 29,746.
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information, and whether it exports products that are either on the
Munitions List or which require a validated export license.194 An ac-
quisition for which the notice would contain such information can be
assumed to have national security aspects, so that Exon-Florio could
apply.
Other sources can also illuminate what constitutes "national secur-
ity" in the Exon-Florio context. The most obvious example is, of
course, section 232. The sort of determinations made by the ITA in
identifying the military uses of a product, and the methods used to
determine whether imports of the product threaten to impair the na-
tional security, could serve as guides to CFIUS in making its decisions
under Exon-Florio, and to the President in deciding whether to act.
Indeed, the ultimate standard for both statutes is the same: whether a
given act (importation of an article for section 232, acquisition of a
U.S. person for Exon-Florio) threatens to impair the national security.
By the same token, however, the comments on the shortcomings of the
definition of "national security" under section 232195 are equally rele-
vant to Exon-Florio.
Another approach to determine whether a transaction should be
acted upon by the President is to identify "key" industries or technolo-
gies, foreign acquisitions of firms that could be presumed to affect the
national security. The General Accounting Office has reported a list
of industries critical to national security. 96 Similarly, the Depart-
ments of Defense and Energy have established a list of technologies
considered crucial to national security. 197 The problem with this ap-
proach is that, while all of the technologies identified affect national
security, many are also relevant to purely civilian, non-security related
products.
A variation of this approach would be to identify excluded indus-
tries, i.e., industries in which acquisitions would be presumed not to
have national security ramifications. 198 Similarly, CFIUS could estab-
194. See supra note 129.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
196. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INDUSTRIAL BASE: DEFENSE-CRITICAL IN-
DUSTRIES, Briefing Report to Sen. John Heinz (Aug. 1988).
197. See Tolchin, Crucial Technologies. 22 Make the U.S. List, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1989,
at DI, col. 3. The critical technologies listed are microelectronic circuitry; preparation of gal-
lium arsenide and other compound semiconductors; software design productivity; parallel
processing for high-speed computers; robotics; simulation and modeling; integrated optics using
light instead of electricity; fiber optics; sensitive radars; passive sensors; automatic target recogni-
tion; phased array radar; data fusion; signature control used in creating hard-to-detect weapons;
computational fluid dynamics; air-breathing (jet engine) propulsion; high-power microwaves;
mobile high-power lasers; kinetic kill energy; light-weight composite materials; superconductiv-
ity; and biotechnology materials and processing. See id.
198. See, e.g., Greater Certainty, Narrower Scope Urged for. Exon-Florio Final Rules, Regula-
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lish a presumption that transactions below a certain dollar value do
not have national security effects. 199 The obvious drawback of this
approach is that even a very small acquisition could have an impact
upon the national security if it involved a company with state-of-the-
art technology or that was the sole producer of a critical defense good.
Other sources are also helpful in determining whether the potential
transfer of control over technology raises national security concerns.
For example, the Defense Department's Industrial Security Regula-
tion defines critical technology as militarily significant technology that
is not possessed by potential adversaries and which, if acquired by
them, would permit a substantial advance in their military capabili-
ties. 200 Critical technology (a) contributes to the superior characteris-
tics of current military systems; (b) relates to specific military
deficiencies of a potential adversary and would contribute significantly
to the enhancement of their military mission; or (c) is an emerging
technology with a high potential for having a major impact upon ad-
vanced weapon systems.20' The Department of Defense maintains a
list of critical technologies. 20 2 Thus, an acquisition involving transfer
of control of such technology to a foreign person would have national
security implications, and should be reported.
Besides assessing the potential effects of a transaction upon the na-
tional security, the President (and by implication CFIUS) must also
determine whether the foreign acquiror is likely to exercise its control
in a manner that threatens to.impair the national security. 20 3 This is
analogous to the determination made by the ITA under section 232 in
identifying reliable sources of imports. Some practices by the ITA,
such as its reliance upon the State Department's analysis, 2°4 would no
doubt be of use to CFIUS. However, the determination made by the
ITA under section 232 differs qualitatively from that necessary under
Exon-Florio. The ITA has interpreted section 232 in a fairly narrow
tion, Economics and Law (BNA), at A-3 (Oct. 4, 1989). Examples of potential excluded indus-
tries are hotels and real estate, food and agriculture, and securities, insurance, and financial
services.
199. See id. at A-4. During the period 1984-88, approximately 55% of transactions involv-
ing acquisitions of companies or assets involved the assets valued between $1 million and $15
million. However, a $15 million threshold would exempt only about 4% of the total value of
assets involved in transactions involving foreign purchasers. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Dept. Commerce (unpublished data).
200. See U.S. Dept. of Defense 84/DoD 5220.22-R, app. D, at D-102 (Dec. 4, 1985).
201. See id. at 21-22.
202. See U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN FOR THE COMMITTEES
ON ARMED SERVICES (Mar. 15, 1989, revised May 5, 1989).
203. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(d)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
204. See supra note 62.
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manner, and in particular has defined "threatens to impair the na-
tional security" in a manner that allows a relatively mechanical test.
Specifically, as discussed above, the ITA essentially bases its determi-
nation on whether there will be a shortfall of the necessary product in
a defined situation. Although the performance of this test is complex,
the test is at least straightforward. The calculus the President must
perform under Exon-Florio is much more complicated, as the focus of
the Act is not simply on whether imports are having a demonstrable
present effect. Instead, Exon-Florio requires the President to predict
future developments, from such obvious factors as whether the foreign
acquiror is likely to close down facilities producing key defense prod-
ucts or misuse confidential information to such subtle considerations
as whether the foreign acquiror will continue to fund research and
development adequately. With regard to this aspect of Exon-Florio,
therefore, little useful precedent and guidance exist. 205
Even with this minimal guidance, determining whether Exon-
Florio should or does apply to a given transaction is difficult. Despite
difficulties in applying section 232 discussed above, the ITA's task is
the relatively limited one of determining the effect of imports upon
production of a specific product. CFIUS and the President have the
much more complex task of assessing the probable effects upon the
national security of the acquisition of a U.S. company or business. In
particular, the requirement that the President determine that "there is
credible evidence that leads [him] to believe that the foreign interest
exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the na-
tional security" before acting under the Exon-Florio Act requires him
205. As was noted above, the Treasury Department has stated that it intends to issue final
regulations by summer 1990. Preparatory to this, the Treasury Department requested comments
from interested persons, and has received approximately sixty-five submissions.
Many of the submissions were made by foreign investors concerned about the potentially
broad application of Exon-Florio. The most frequently raised issues were: the lack of a defintion
for "national security"; the unclear definition of the types of transactions c6vered; and the indefi-
nite risk of divestiture. Many of the comments suggested that Treasury establish a list of ex-
empted industries or products to create a safe harbor and narrow the application of Exon-Florio.
Another suggestion common to many of the submissions was that joint ventures explicitly be
excluded from coverage. Some comments addressed the issue of the continued possibility of
divestiture when notification has not occurred or material information is omitted or there is a
material change in the transaction. The comments suggested that "omission of material informa-
tion" be defined to include only information explicitly required by the regulations and that "ma-
terial change" be further defined.
Another major issue raised in the comments was the definition of "control." Some co-
mentators called for more certainty in the definition, such as a requirement of a certain percent-
age ownership. Another frequently raised issue was financial thresholds, requiring notification
only for deals over a certain amount. In light of the time sensitivity of many mergers, a fast-track
procedure for transactions that clearly posed no national security threat was a common sigges-
tion. In regard to agency procedure many submissions included the suggestion that CFIUS pub-
lish its decisions and their basis in the Federal Register.
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to make a sophisticated calculation involving predictions of both the
actions of a specific person (the foreign acquiror) and the effects of
those actions upon the national security of the United States. If deter-
minations under section 232, which are relatively limited in scope and
effect, have economic and foreign policy consequences, then those
under Exon-Florio are doubly wide-ranging in their potential
ramifications.
D. Application of Exon-Florio
Because of its relative youth, the Exon-Florio Act has yet to give
rise to a large body of administrative interpretation. Moreover,
CFIUS is not required to publish its final determinations and recom-
mendations. Nonetheless, sufficient information exists regarding the
cases CFIUS has considered to make at least some tentative conclu-
sions regarding the manner in which the statute has been interpreted
and applied.
Since the enactment of Exon-Florio, a great many cases have been
reported to CFIUS, but very few have actually been investigated. As
of the end of 1989, CFIUS had been notified of 170 acquisitions, but
had investigated only six.206 With regard to these six, CFIUS has
made recommendations to the President regarding only four. In no
case has the President acted under Exon-Florio, although in one case
the transaction went ahead after the foreign acquiror agreed to certain
conditions "suggested" by the United States government.
The first case before CFIUS under the new law was the proposed
sale of Monsanto Electronic Materials Co., a unit of Monsanto Co., a
major United States chemical company, to Heuls AG, a subsidiary of
VEBA AG of West Germany. The Monsanto division produced
silicon wafers, the basic material for making semiconductor devices.
CFIUS initiated an investigation upon the request of the Department
of Defense and the Department of Commerce, which expressed con-
cerns over the possible transfer of wafer technology outside the United
States.
20 7
After. a full investigation, CFIUS recommended that the sale be
allowed to proceed. 20 8 Before CFIUS made its decision, however, two
events of significance occurred. First, two trade associations of raw
materials and equipment suppliers to the semiconductor industry,
206. See Tolchin, US. Will Scrutinize a Chinese Deal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1989, at D4 col.1.
207. See Sale of Silicoi Wafer Maker to German Firm Cleared After National Security Re-
view, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 152 (Feb. 1, 1989).
208. See id.
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SEMI and SEMATECH, contacted CFIUS and explained their oppo-
sition to the sale. 209 This is noteworthy because the proposed regula-
tions contain no provision for the participation of parties other than
those involved in the subject acquisition. The experience in the Mon-
santo investigation indicates that CFIUS will consider comments by
such outside parties.
Second, Heuls transmitted a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury,
in which the West German company promised to function as an
American company, to cooperate with SEMATECH, not to condone
transfers of technology to foreign entities, and to attempt to make the
purchased Monsanto unit profitable. 210 Heuls also promised to keep
production in the United States for five years, to continue research and
development operations in the United States, and to make products
available to the U.S. semiconductor industry.211 These commitments
by Heuls were widely viewed as integral to CFIUS's decision to rec-
ommend no action to the President. 212 The statutory language gives
neither CFIUS nor the President direct authority to impose conditions
for the approval of a transaction. As a practical matter, however, such
authority plainly exists, for if the foreign acquiror does not agree to
the conditions, the President could simply prohibit the transaction, a
determination not subject to judicial review.
21 3
In the end, CFIUS apparently based its decision upon the conclu-
sion that the purchase by Heuls was necessary for the Monsanto unit
to survive, as Monsanto had lost hundreds of millions of dollars and
was effectively liquidating it by allocating capital to other divisions.
214
CFIUS may have been particularly impressed by the fact that the De-
partment of Defense had actually offered to purchase half of the Mon-
santo unit, although no other U.S. company was willing to purchase
209. See CFIUS Review Nightmare, supra note 150, at 5.
210. See id. at 4.
211. See Tolchin, Agency on Foreign Takeovers Wielding Power, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1989,
at D6, col. 4.
212. See id.
213. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(d)(2) (West Supp. 1989). An interesting question is what,
if anything, CFIUS or the President could do should a foreign acquiror renege on its commit-
ments. One possible ground for action would be the provision in the proposed regulations al-
lowing CFIUS to reject a voluntary notice if, after the notice has been submitted, a material
change in the transaction occurs. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 134, at 29,754,
§ 800.402(g). CFIUS could argue that this provision allows it to reconsider transactions even
after it has approved them and they have been consummated, on the theory that the failure to
keep commitments constitutes a material change. While this rationale has some appeal where
the acquiring party made the commitments in bad faith, its equity is doubtful when failure to
satisfy the commitments arises from external events, such as a sharp decline in the profitability or
market of the acquired U.S. company.
214. See CFIUS Review Nightmare, supra note 151, at 11.
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the other half.2 15 Yet, even under these circumstances, where the ap-
parent choice was to allow the transaction or to risk the U.S. producer
simply going out of business, and where the foreign acquiror was a
national of West Germany, a close military ally of the United States,
CFIUS's decision aroused political opposition, as witnessed by letters
from twenty-nine Congressmen to President Bush following CFIUS's
decision urging him to block the purchase. 21 6 This episode demon-
strates the extent to which decisions under Exon-Florio have political
implications. Despite this opposition, the President accepted CFIUS's
recommendation and approved the sale.
2 17
CFIUS reached a different result in the proposed acquisition of
General Ceramics Inc. by Tokuyama Soda Co. of Japan. General Ce-
ramics manufactures high temperature, high stress ceramics which
have some defense uses, including in nuclear weapons. The Depart-
ments of Treasury, Commerce, Defense, and Energy requested that
CFIUS investigate the proposed acquisition after General Ceramics
informed the Department of the Treasury of the proposed transaction.
The specific grounds for their request was that General Ceramics held
a classified defense research and development contract with the De-
partment of Energy connected with nuclear weapons, and that,
through the acquisition, Tokuyama could gain access to the confiden-
tial information contained in the contract.
2' 8
CFIUS subsequently initiated a full investigation, in which it fo-
cused on the classified contract and the possibility of a transfer of sen-
sitive technology. 21 9 At the end of the investigation, CFIUS
unofficially informed the parties that it would recommend to the Presi-
dent that he bar the deal. Consequently, General Ceramics formally
withdrew its notification, thus ending the review process and removing
the need for CFIUS to make a formal recommendation to the Presi-
dent. General Ceramics stated that it was discussing with the U.S.
215. See Nathans, supra note 116, at 91. One Department of Defense official summarized
CFIUS's reasoning by explaining, "The issue was for Monsanto to close it or sell it to someone
who would build it up. CFIUS made the reasonable decision that it would be better to have it in
stronger hands than evaporate." Id.
216. See Bush Clears Sale of Monsanto Wafer Unit to West German Firm Despite Opposition,
6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 182 (Feb. 8, 1989). The main concern expressed was that the Mon-
santo unit was the last domestic producer of silicon wafers, and that its sale to Heuls would make
U.S. silicon chip producers wholly dependent upon foreign sources of raw materials. This in turn
could have long-term effects upon the high technology infrastructure of the United States. Id.
217. See id.
218. See Administration Investigates Foreign Merger with U.S. Weapons Contractor, Inside
U.S. Trade, Mar. 10, 1989, at 12 [hereinafter Administration Investigates Foreign Merger].
219. See Nuclear Contractor Sale to Japanese Firm Under National Security Investigation, 6
Int'l Trade Rept. (BNA) 339-40 (Mar. 15, 1989).
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government ways to resolve the classified contract issue,220 and that it
and Tokuyama would explore ways of restructuring the transaction
that would satisfy CFIUS's concerns. 221 General Ceramics ultimately
agreed to assign its classified contract to another U.S. company and to
sell the related assets, so that after renotification it obtained CFIUS's
approval for the proposed acquisition.
222
The General Ceramics case represents a relatively clear-cut type of
transaction in which CFIUS is likely to intervene. The acquisition of
General Ceramics could have allowed a foreign purchaser access to
highly confidential information regarding nuclear weapons, a rela-
tively obvious threat to national secuirity. The identity of the pur-
chaser was probably significant as well. Tokuyama was a Japanese
firm, and there had recently been concern over sales of sensitive mili-
tary equipment by other Japanese companies to the Soviet Union.
Moreover, there were no concerns that, without the acquisition, Gen-
eral Ceramics would go out of business.
Finally, Tokuyama's role as a member of the Japanese soda cartel
could not have helped it. The existence of this cartel has been an
ongoing source of trade friction between the United States and Ja-
pan. 223 CFIUS stressed that it made its determination on national se-
curity grounds alone, but it is possible that other factors were involved
as well. 224 Even under these circumstances, CFIUS notified the par-
ties of its intended recommendation, thus allowing them to withdraw
notification and attempt to restructure the transaction, rather than
risk a formal negative recommendation and a prohibition of the acqui-
sition by the President. 225 Moreover, Tokuyama and General Ceram-
ics subsequently agreed that General Ceramics would sell the part of
the company holding the classified contract that had been the source
of CFIUS's concern, so that the acquisition was ultimately
completed.
226
220. See Japanese Bid for Firm Put on Hold After CFIUS Decides to Urge Block, 6 Int'l
Trade Rept. (BNA) 491-92 (April 19, 1989).
221. See Farnsworth, US. Blocks Japanese Acquisition, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1989, at DI,
col. 6.
222. See Nathans, supra note 116, at 91. It was noted, however, that the sensitivity of Japa-
nese companies to controversies of this sort could persuade the Japanese purchaser not to go
through with the acquisition, even with U.S. approval.
223. See Administration Investigates Foreign Merger, supra note 218, at 1, 13.
224. See Tolchin, supra note 197; see also Administration Investigates Foreign Merger, supra
note 218, at 12.
225. However, it should be noted that there is nothing in the statute or in the regulations that
would prohibit a party from restructuring an acquisition and again seeking approval, even fol-
lowing an original negative determination and prohibition.
226. See Officials from Japan, The Netherlands Differ in Exon-Florio Provision Views, Meet-
ing told, 7 Int'l Trade Rept. (BNA) 410 (Mar. 21, 1990).
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A third case in which CFIUS conducted a full investigation was
the proposed acquisition of three divisions of Fairchild Industries by
Matra SA of France. The Fairchild divisions were engaged in defense
and aerospace technology, while Matra is a French conglomerate in-
volved in aerospace and defense technologies, among others. The
Commerce Department requested the investigation to ensure that Ma-
tra would comply with U.S. export control laws, as Matra would have
access to sensitive U.S. products and technologies as a consequence of
the acquisition.
227
CFIUS conducted a full investigation of the proposed transaction.
During the course of the investigation, the Commerce Department,
which administers the export control laws, worked with Matra to de-
velopa comprehensive export management scheme to prevent the un-
authorized exportation of sensitive products and technologies.
Matra's final solution was satisfactory, and convinced CFIUS to rec-
ommend approval to the President, who subsequently granted ap-
proval. 228 Other factors which CFIUS and the President may have
considered as well were Matra's decision to use U.S. personnel to run
the acquired units, and to transfer responsibility for the units' classi-
fied work to a voting trust of three United States proxyholders. 229 As
with the Monsanto transaction, the significance of CFIUS's treatment
of the Fairchild acquisition was the agency's willingness to, and indeed
insistence on, working with the foreign acquiror to resolve the national
security aspects of the transaction in a manner that would allow
CFIUS to approve the transaction.
Another full investigation involved the proposed joint venture be-
tween Westinghouse Electric Corp. and Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), a
Swiss-Swedish electrical engineering concern, to manufacture and sell
electric power generation products. Under the terms of the joint ven-
ture, ABB would hold a forty-five percent stake, but would have the
option of acquiring Westinghouse's fifty-five percent stake as well.
230
The investigation was commenced upon the request of the Depart-
ments of Defense and Commerce, which were apparently concerned
that the proposed venture could limit the availability of high-powered
227. See Bush Will Not Block French Firm's Acquisition of Fairchild Industries'Space, De-
fense Units, 6 Int'l Trade Rept. (BNA) 1096 (Aug. 23, 1989).
228. Id.
229. See Marcus, Fairchild Buy Gives French Matra SA Foot in Door of U.S. Market, SPACE
NEWS, Sept. 18, 1989, at 12.
230. See Bush Won't Block Swiss Electric Deal After CFIUS Exon-Florio Investigation, 6 Int'l
Trade Rept. (BNA) 664 (May 24, 1989). [Hereinafter Bush Won't Block Swiss Electric Deal].
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electrical transmission equipment. 23' CFIUS ultimately recom-
mended approval of the joint venture, a recommendation the President
accepted. Among the factors affecting CFIUS's decision was ABB's
affirmation that it intended to continue the manufacture, research, and
design of the relevant products in the United States.
232
The Westinghouse case confirms that CFIUS will treat joint ven-
tures as acquisitions where there is a possibility of the foreign partner
gaining control of the assets of the venture. It also demonstrates that
CFIUS will examine a transaction where the potential for foreign con-
trol exists, even though the foreign acquiror does not presently have
and will not necessarily obtain such control. Finally, CFIUS's deci-
sion emphasizes that the agency will give weight to assurances that
production and research and development activities will be carried on
in the United States.
The most recent transaction investigated by CFIUS marks the first
time the President has actually used his authority to forbid an acquisi-
tion or to order divestiture under Exon-Florio. This investigation in-
volved the sale of Mamco Manufacturing Co., a producer of metal
components used in aircraft, to the Chinese Aerotechnology Import-
Export Corp. (CATIC), an agency of the government of the People's
Republic of China. The focus of the investigation was whether
Mamco possessed technology applicable to military as well as civilian
uses, and whether the acquisition of Mamco could lead to the transfer
of such technology to China.
233
The notice of the acquisition was filed while the sale of Mamco was
still pending, but the transaction was consummated before the investi-
gation was complete. Following a full investigation, CFIUS recom-
mended that the President order CATIC to sell Mamco. Although
the precise grounds for CFIUS's decision are unclear, it was reported
that CATIC made military fighters, bombers, and helicopters as well
as civilian aircraft, and that CATIC had attempted to obtain military
technology illegally from the United States in the past. 234 The Presi-
dent accepted CFIUS's recommendation, and ordered CATIC to
divest itself completely of Mamco. 235 CATIC was given three months
to do so; CFIUS was to monitor the divestiture process.
231. See CFIUS Investigates Possible Ventures Between Westinghouse Corp., Swiss Company,
6 Int'l Trade Rept. (BNA) 398 (Mar. 29, 1989).
232. See Bush Won't Block Swiss Electric Deal, supra note 227, at 665.
233. See Tolchin, supra note 206, at D4, col. 1.
234. See Auerbach, Bush Urged to Bar Deal With China, Wash. Post, Feb. 2, 1990, at GI.
235. See Bush Orders Divestiture of Chinese Acquisition on National Security Grounds, Reg.,
Econ. & L. (BNA) A-6 (Feb. 5, 1990).
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The Mamco case marks possibly the most extreme situation likely
to arise under Exon-Florio. It involved a U.S. company with military
technology on the one hand, and an agency of a foreign government
that was not a military ally of the United States on the other. In addi-
tion, the acquiring party had allegedly engaged in previous attempts to
acquire U.S. defense technology illegally. Interestingly, MAMCO de-
nied that its products had direct military applications except insofar as
some of the Boeing Company commercial planes for which it supplied
parts had military counterparts. The company also noted that it had
no classified contracts, and that, although it did have certain technol-
ogy subject to export controls, CATIC had received U.S. export
licenses on other occasions. 236 Significantly, the President ordered
complete divestiture; there was apparently no inclination on the part
of CFIUS to negotiate with CATIC for changes in the acquisition or
for undertakings regarding transfer of technology, etc. that would
have ameliorated CFIUS's security concerns. Despite this, CATIC in-
dicated that it would attempt to restructure the proposed acquisition
to attempt to alleviate the national security problems involved. 237 Fi-
nally, it is possible that purely political considerations played a role -
in this case, the President's desire to appear strong in relations with
China in the wake of criticism of what was perceived as a weak reac-
tion to the Chinese government's forceful suppression of democratic
dissent in June 1989.238
In understanding how CFIUS has interpreted the Exon-Florio
Act, and in predicting possible directions of future enforcement, it is
also helpful to review instances in which CFIUS decided not to initiate
an investigation of a transaction. One of the first of these, and the one
that probably attracted the most public attention, was the acquisition
of Consolidated Gold Fields PLC by Minorco SA in a hostile take-
over. Neither of these companies was a U.S. person; Gold Fields is a
British company, while Minorco is a Luxembourg investment com-
pany controlled in turn by Anglo American Corp. of South Africa and
De Beers Consolidated Mines Corp., two South African companies.
Gold Fields notified CFIUS of the transaction, however, because it
owned a fifty percent interest in Newmont Mining Corp., a leading
U.S. gold producer. In its notice, Gold Fields claimed that the acqui-
sition could impair the national security of the United States by con-
236. See Chinese Company Seeking "Solution" to Order to Divest Aircraft Parts Maker, 7 Int'l
Trade Rept. (BNA) 302 (Feb. 28, 1990).
237. See id.
238. See Chinese Company Objects to Bush Decision on Sale, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1990, at
GI, col. 6.
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centrating control over certain strategic metals in the hands of foreign
nationals.
239
CFIUS determined within the initial thirty-day review period that
the transaction did not threaten to impair the national security of the
United States, and therefore did not merit a full investigation. The
agency based its determination upon a finding that, even if a total in-
terruption of supply resulted, U.S. supplies of the relevant metals were
sufficient to meet U.S. needs. Consequently, CFIUS would not take
further action regarding the transaction. 24°
Although CFIUS did not conduct a full investigation, its handling
of the Gold Fields transaction is nonetheless highly instructive in sev-
eral areas. The first is in the agency's functional definition of "na-
tional security." In this case, the issue confronting CFIUS was the
straightforward one of foreign control over a product, a simpler issue
than transactions involving high technology, where factors such as dis-
semination of technology or future funding of research and develop-
ment could be present. CFIUS accordingly used a definition of
"national security" quite like that employed in section 232 investiga-
tions.24t It showed no hesitation in investigating the transaction even
though the main parties were both foreign companies. Finally,
CFIUS's rapid handling of the transaction lessened the utility of notifi-
cation as a device in a battle against a hostile takeover, although a
different result might obviously have been reached had CFIUS decided
to launch a full investigation. 242
239. See CFIUS Finds No National Security Threat in South African Bid for U.K. Minerals
Firm, 6 Int'l Trade Rept. (BNA) 396 (Mar. 29, 1989) [hereinafter CFIUS Finds No National
Security Threat]; see also Krieger, supra note 117, at 350-53.
240. See id. In making its determination, CFIUS relied upon the specialized expertise of the
Bureau of Mines in assessing U.S. supply and needs for various metals and minerals, including
gold, rutile, zircon, and platinum. CFIUS assumed a worst case scenario, under which there was
a total interruption of supply of the strategic mineral assets of Minorco and other companies
affiliated with South African firms or nationals. The agency found that U.S. strategic stockpiles,
production capacity, and existing inventories would be sufficient to satisfy U.S. strategic needs.
CFIUS also determined that the purchase would not violate the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid
Act. Id.
241. See supra text accompanying note 59. Because CFIUS found that there was no threat to
the national security, even assuming a total interruption of supply, it did not have to reach the
next, highly political question: whether there was credible evidence to believe that foreign con-
trol of Newmont could lead to such an interruption. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(d) (West Supp.
1989) (the President may act only if "there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe
that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national
security"). Although this subsection is entitled "Findings of the President," CFIUS would pre-
sumably have to reach the same conclusion before recommending that the President act to sus-
pend or prohibit a transaction.
242. With respect to the possible use of CFIUS as a weapon in battles for corporate control,
it is interesting to note that Gold Fields was able to obtain an injunction from a federal district
court on grounds that the acquisition would violate the antitrust laws of the United States. The
acquisition of Gold Fields had previously been delayed when it was referred by the government
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Besides Minorco, there have been a great number of cases where
CFIUS did not proceed to a full investigation. Often, these involved
transactions that clearly did not have national security implications.
243
This indicates that CFIUS has some sort of bright-line test, and also
calls into question the utility of the routine invocation of Exon-Florio
as an anti-takeover device.
From these examples, it is possible to draw some conclusions re-
garding the manner in which CFIUS has interpreted and applied
Exon-Florio. Thus far, the agency's application of the law has been
rather conservative. In the only case in which disapproval of a trans-
action was recommended, highly sensitive technology and products
were involved. In determining whether to investigate, and whether to
recommend approval or disapproval, CFIUS has focused on such ob-
vious factors as whether the target company held classified contracts
or was the last U.S. producer of an item with crucial defense applica-
tions. The potential for unauthorized dissemination of sensitive tech-
nology has been a source of particular concern. Although CFIUS has
generally concentrated on national security concerns only, the fear has
been raised that the agency may be considering other, subjective fac-
tors as well, such as the identity or nationality of the foreign acquiror.
On the other hand, CFIUS has shown its willingness to work with
the parties to structure the transaction in a manner that will satisfy
national security concerns, and has in fact essentially made such
changes to the transaction a condition for approval. Based on the ad-
mittedly limited number of investigations that have occurred, it is
nonetheless safe to conclude that CFIUS and the President prefer suc-
cessful transactions, so long as the national security concerns raised
are addressed. CFIUS has also shown itself willing to accept assur-
ances regarding the maintenance of production and research and de-
velopment in the United States, without the foreign acquiror
necessarily undertaking a formal commitment to do so. Finally,
CFIUS has handled most cases expeditiously, so that the potential for
use of Exon-Florio as an anti-takeover device has been limited.
of the United Kingdom to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. See CFIUS Finds No
National Security Threat, supra note 234, at 396. This simply illustrates that, in hostile take-
overs, the target company has a variety of defensive techniques other than Exon-Florio available
to it. This indicates that much of the concern over Exon-Florio as a possible anti-takeover device
may be misplaced or exaggerated.
243. See Nathans, supra note 116, at 91. Examples of such cases are transactions involving a
tulip-bulb grower, a swimming pool company, and a timber owner. On the other hand, CFIUS
has also declined to investigate the hostile takeover of a company with classified contracts for
hologram technology, a case that on its face would appear to merit investigation. Id.
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E. Future Enforcement of Exon-Florio
As was noted above, the enactment of Exon-Florio was greeted
with near-universal dismay by the trading and investment partners of
the United States. At the same time, the act has aroused concern and
even fear among investors in the United States. 244 If the past applica-
tion of Exon-Florio is any guide to the future, most of these fears ap-
pear misplaced. As reviewed above, CFIUS has actually
recommended disapproval of only two transactions, one involving per-
haps the most sensitive technology possible (nuclear weapons), and the
other involving the purchase of a U.S. company by an agency of a
Communist government. Even in the first case, CFIUS unofficially
informed the parties of its conclusion, allowing them to withdraw no-
tice of the transaction so as to avoid a formal recommendation of ap-
proval, and the transaction was subsequently completed after
restructuring in a manner that addressed CFIUS's concerns.
One source of special concern has been that Exon-Florio may be
routinely invoked as an anti-takeover device in hostile situations. 245
So far at least, it has not been a particularly useful weapon, as a review
of CFIUS's decision not to initiate a full investigation in the Goldfields
case indicates. In fact, of the approximately 240 notices of acquisi-
tions that have been filed with CFIUS, only some twelve have involved
hostile takeovers. The CFIUS has barred none of these transactions,
nor even intervened to the extent of requiring modification of the
terms of the transaction. Furthermore, because of the short time lim-
its within which CFIUS will act, invocation of Exon-Florio is of lim-
ited utility as a delaying tactic.
The one situation in which recourse to the act could be successful
for an unwilling target is the presently rare one in which the U.S. com-
pany can show that control by the foreign acquiror could have a nega-
tive effect upon national security. This is likely to occur only where
the U.S. company either has access to highly sensitive technology or is
the sole producer of an item with defense applications, although it
could arise where the target company has state-of-the-art products or
technologies, even if it currently has no defense contracts.
Exon-Florio could also have another, indirect use as an antitake-
over device. Under the securities laws of the United States, in an ac-
quisition involving the purchase of publicly-traded securities, the
tender offer must disclose all material facts relevant to the transac-
244. Id. at 88.
245. Id. at 91.
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tion.246 The filing of an Exon-Florio notice by the target company in a
hostile takeover situation would clearly constitute a "material fact," as
it could lead ultimately to an undoing of the transaction. Under such
circumstances, the filing of a notice alone could raise doubts among
shareholders as to the likelihood of success of the takeover attempt,
itself a powerful weapon on the part of the target company. For this
reason, the acquiror in a hostile Exon-Florio situation might wish to
file a notice itself, so that it can attempt to gain control of the situa-
tion. The same would be true even in a friendly takeover of a publicly-
traded company if there is a possibility that a government agency
might file a notice.
Another issue relevant to the future enforcement of the Act arises
from its status under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
and in particular the results of the current Uruguay Round of negotia-
tions. In this round, trade-related investment measures have been a
subject of discussion, especially by the United States, which has ex-
pressed the concern that such measures can be used to restrict trade
indirectly. 247 Given the high profile of the U.S. position on this issue,
and the concern that the Exon-Florio Act has aroused in many of its
trading partners, 248 it is possible that other countries could point to
the Act as a possible trade-restricting investment measure by the
United States. It is unlikely, however, that such claims would have
much effect. In the first place, although application of the Act could
have some effect on trade, that effect is less direct than that of other
potential trade-related investment measures, such as local content or
export requirements for investment. Furthermore, Exon-Florio would
appear to fall solidly within the exception to the GATT for actions
taken for reasons of national security.
249
Another possibility always present in such situations is that other
246. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988); see also Securities Exchange Act rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-4 (1989), and Schedule 13E-4, id. § 240.13e-4(c). Failure to disclose this information
would leave the tender offeror open to penalties for securities fraud. In addition, under rule 14e-
2, id. § 240.14e-2, the target company is required to disclose its recommendation regarding the
tender offer to its security holders, with the reasons for its recommendation. That the target
company had filed an Exon-Florio notice, and believed that there was a possibility that the acqui-
sition would be prohibited or substantively modified by the President, would clearly be relevant
to the company's recommendation.
247. See Office of The United States Trade Representative, Clarification of U.S. Position
stated in "A Structure for Negotiating a Comprehensive Agreement on TRIMs" (MTN. GNG/
NGI2/WS), at 2 (Jan. 29, 1990). The United States' position in these negotiations is that all
investment performance requirements that could affect trade negatively, such as local content,
local procurement, or export requirements, should be prohibited. The U.S. position would also
prohibit requirements that restrict the ability to invest because of the nationality of the investor.
248. See supra text accompanying note 113.
249. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXI, supra note 8.
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countries could threaten to retaliate against the United States by
adopting similar measures. In fact, a number of the major trading
partners of the United States, including the United Kingdom and Ger-
many, have laws that allow the government to bar acquisitions for rea-
sons of national security. A number of other countries restrict foreign
investment in specified industries on national security grounds. Given
the presence of these laws, the possibilities for retaliation appear
limited.
As with section 232, there are also some concrete problems with
the manner in which Exon-Florio has been applied. CFIUS's practice
in the past has been to make decisions on a case-by-case basis, with
each transaction judged on its own merits. Such a limited approach
may not be sufficiently comprehensive, however, in the case of "creep-
ing takeovers," through which a foreign acquiror gains control of an
industry first through control of raw materials, then manufacturing
equipment, and finally production of the finished article. As with sec-
tion 232, the language of Exon-Florio is flexible enough to allow for a
full consideration of the effects of a takeover downstream. The ques-
tion is whether CFIUS, given current policies, will take advantage of
this flexibility and adopt a broader view of the effect of takeovers.
Another concern similar to those associated with section 232 is the
ability of Exon-Florio to deal with high-technology industries. Again,
the focus of this concern is the rapidity with which technology change
occurs, and the very high expense associated with the development of
high technology. CFIUS has shown itself to be sensitive to foreign
acquisition of high-technology industries in particular, where the rele-
vant technology has direct military applications. The important ques-
tion here is whether CFIUS will show the same aggressiveness in
interpretation when the technology is in an infant stage, where its ulti-
mate military uses have not yet been established.
The future application of Exon-Florio is inextricably intertwined
with the attitude towards foreign investment held by the administra-
tion in power. To the extent that foreign investment is viewed posi-
tively, as is currently true with the Bush administration, application of
Exon-Florio is likely to be restricted to cases clearly and directly in-
volving the national security. Future administrations may have a less
sanguine regard for foreign investment, in which case Exon-Florio
could be applied in a broader manner. It is unlikely, however, that
any administration would apply Exon-Florio in the manner feared by
its critics. The United States has become reliant, if not dependent,
upon foreign investment, and the indiscriminate use of Exon-Florio
could discourage investment in even non-security related areas. Indis-
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criminate application would also be at odds with the long-standing
U.S. policy of encouraging freedom of investment, with consequent
effects upon the ability of U.S. investors to operate in other countries.
Another obvious limiting factor is reciprocity and the possibility of
retaliation. The decision by the President to use Exon-Florio to affect
or prohibit a transaction is essentially a political decision and, thus,
subject to political considerations. Given the increasingly integrated
structure of the international economy, and the identification of U.S.
interests with increased integration, use of Exon-Florio in an indis-
criminate manner simply is not consistent with the political and eco-
nomic interests of the United States. Moreover, as was shown above,
application of the statute thus far has been the very opposite of indis-
criminate. In fact, at least one Japanese official has indicated that Ja-
pan thinks that Exon-Florio has been applied in a fair manner, and
that the U.S. government has assisted parties to transactions in putting
them into a form that will permit their approval. 250 This indicates
that concerns over the widespread use of Exon-Florio as a means of
barring foreign investment have been exaggerated.
Perhaps the real significance of Exon-Florio lies, not in its com-
mercial or even defense effects, but in its exemplification of a new
awareness in the United States of the interrelationship of economics
and national security. So long as the United States was unquestiona-
bly the predominant economic power in the world, national security
was defined solely in terms of military defense. With the passage of
U.S. primacy on one hand, and the amazingly rapid disappearance of
the military threat from the Warsaw Pact that had so long dominated
U.S. strategic thinking on the other, the focus of concern has shifted
from military strength to economic competitiveness. The enactment
of Exon-Florio indicates an awareness by the United States that both
its economic and military situation have changed, a development that
must generally be considered positive. The question now is whether
"national security" will be redefined within the context of Exon-Florio
away from a narrow military defense definition to a broader definition
encompassing economic welfare and international competitiveness as
an integral element of national security. The problems of such a defi-
nition were discussed above with respect to the need for a new defini-
tion of "national security" under section 232.251
The question of the proper definition of "national security" is, if
anything, more pressing with respect to Exon-Florio. Section 232 ad-
250. See Officials from Japan, The Netherlands Differ on Exon-Florio Provision Views, Meet-
ing Told, 7 Int'l Trade Rept. (BNA) 410 (Mar. 21, 1990).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 102-104.
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dresses a relatively narrow problem. The condition towards which
Exon-Florio is directed is much broader and deeper. Essentially,
Exon-Florio asks when foreign ownership of U.S. assets threatens the
national security of the United States. As a purely military definition
of "national security" becomes, if not obsolete, increasingly irrelevant,
the need to redefine what constitutes the national security of the
United States will move ever closer to the fore.
The United States is not the only country experiencing this change.
Indeed, what constitutes national security is relevant to all countries
as they consider what sort of actions with respect to foreign trade and
foreign investment are necessary to protect their vital interests. That
this issue has not yet come fully to the fore is reflected by the fact that
it is not a subject of direct negotiation in the current Uruguay Round
of GATT. It is possible, however, that as this development proceeds,
the question of what constitutes "national security" will become an
appropriate subject of international discussion and agreement. It is
not the province of this article to attempt to resolve that question; it is
sufficient for the present merely to realize that it will constitute one of
the central issues for the American polity in the coming decade. In
this way, examination of a relatively restricted, seldom-invoked law
and its application highlights one of the greatest decisions the United
States must make regarding itself and its place in the world in the
years to come.
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